Yesterday, Freakonomics featured the Breakthrough Institute on a panel of experts debating the myriad of questions surrounding the costs of Japan and Germany's recent decisions to turn away from nuclear power. The Freakonomics Quorum posed the following question:
With Japan deciding not to expand its nuclear power base, and Germany and Switzerland vowing to phase out nuclear power altogether, how will those (and other) countries replace that electricity, and what sort of political, economic, and environmental trickle-down effects will we see?
The Breakthrough Institute's response is appended below. The Freakonomics Quorum and full participant responses can be viewed here.
In the months following the tsunami-triggered nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi power station, both Japan and Germany announced major U-turns on nuclear policy. In separate, politically calculated moves, Chancellor Angela Merkel vowed to end Germany's reliance on nuclear power by 2022, while Prime Minister Naoto Kan scrapped plans to ramp up nuclear generation to 50 percent of Japan's power supply in the coming decades, each while reaffirming already-ambitious climate change goals.
The reality, however, is that turning their backs on nuclear power could push both nations' climate and environmental objectives out of reach. Simultaneously achieving both a nuclear phase-out and deep emissions cuts would necessitate an unprecedented - and unlikely - scale-up of renewable energy generation to fill the void left by the German and Japanese nuclear fleets.
Updated 5/13/2011 to include construction costs for Japan's proposed 14 nuclear reactors.
On Tuesday, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that the country would scrap its plans to increase nuclear power's contribution to electricity generation to 50 percent by 2030, in response to the crisis at Fukushima's Daiichi nuclear complex. Replacing nuclear power's sizable role in Japan's energy system with a greater reliance on imported coal or liquefied natural gas (LNG) could increase Japan's CO2 emissions by up to 26 percent relative to current levels while damaging the nation's trade balance, while replacing nuclear with renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and geothermal energy would require a roughly 50-fold increase in the electricity provided by these sources, as well as considerable replacement costs.
Japan's Nuclear Plans on Hold
Prior to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis, Japan had planned to increase nuclear power's share of national electricity generation to 50% from roughly 30% today. To achieve this increase, Japan had planned to construct fourteen new nuclear power reactors and raise the capacity factor of the country's existing nuclear power plants to 90%, an increase from roughly 72% in 2009 to a level equivalent to the capacity factors maintained by the U.S. nuclear industry. Existing nuclear plants would have their operating life extended wherever it was deemed safe to do so.
In the following scenarios, we consider the challenge of replacing nuclear power's role in Japan's energy system with fossil and renewable energy alternatives. We consider the new generation required to replace the electricity provided by the fourteen nuclear reactors planned by 2030, as well as assume that Japan does not grant license extensions to any existing plants during this period. By 2030, we therefore assume the retirement of thirty-eight existing Japanese reactors built before 1990, including the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi, totaling 28,431 MW or 61% of the nation's current nuclear capacity.
The total nuclear power generation 'lost' in this scenario totals 399 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2030. We have assumed that the country will still raise the capacity factor of the remaining twenty-one reactors still operating by 2030, providing 21,555 MW of capacity. Under this scenario, nuclear power would still provide almost 15% of Japan's projected electricity demand in 2030.
Japan's blunt declaration last week that it was walking away from the Kyoto climate treaty marked the end of an era. Since Copenhagen, international climate negotiations have proceeded on two parallel tracks, with most major emitting nations simultaneously participating in efforts to extend Kyoto while also working to formalize the Copenhagen Accord - the face-saving agreement among major emitters wrought in the dying hours of the COP-15 meeting in Denmark.
In stating, unequivocally, that it would only make further emissions reductions commitments under the auspices of the Copenhagen Accord, not the Kyoto Protocol, Japan left no doubt about which framework will be the primary vehicle for future international efforts to address climate change.
The announcement set off a small diplomatic riot, largely because Japan had single-handedly destroyed two contradictory fantasies at once. The first, held by Europeans and greens, was that the 2009 Copenhagen Accord would someday merge with Kyoto and require mandatory emissions limits from the U.S. and China. The second, held by China, India, and other big developing nations, was that they could demand emissions reductions from rich countries but adhere to no obligations themselves.
While the Copenhagen Accord, like Kyoto, still maintains the pretense that it will culminate in a binding agreement among major emitters to reduce emissions, the same intractable conflicts among major economies that have thwarted international agreement to legally binding emissions caps are not likely to be resolved through the Copenhagen approach. In reality, the post-Kyoto world is a post-emissions cap world. Future climate action is more likely to resemble what Japan has been proposing since the 2007 Bali climate talks - developed nations primarily focusing on developing and deploying advanced energy technologies in order to reduce their own emissions while working sector by sector with developing economies to transfer the appropriate technologies that can facilitate growth with low carbon technology.
A recent collection of nuclear news over at the Energy Collective suggests that Japan and South Korea are taking major steps to sign lucrative nuclear deals - with relatively little competition from Westinghouse or Areva. And China is planning to increase nuclear capacity nearly eight-fold by 2020 by building reactors locally using Westinghouse AP1000 technology.
This piece was written by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus of the Breakthrough Institute and Charlie Gay of Applied Materials, and originally published in the Austin Statesman. Applied Materials is the world's leading manufacturer of the equipment used to produce solar panels.
Charlie Gay, Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, Special Contributors
A race is on to lead in the burgeoning clean energy sector. While the United States might be behind for now, we are far from the finish line.
America once led the global solar business, but manufacturing scale is shifting to Asia. Strong, targeted government incentives supported markets for solar technology in Japan, a country almost completely dependent upon imported energy.
At the same time, public investment in research and innovation helped build the technical prowess needed to establish solid manufacturing capabilities. The Chinese government, along with numerous entrepreneurs, is developing manufacturing and technical capabilities for solar and other clean energy technologies that will combine economies of scale with a growing market, which many project could be the largest in the world in five years.
Asia's current momentum is not exclusive to solar power. A Breakthrough Institute report, "Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant," found that America lags behind Asia's rising "clean tech tigers" -- China, South Korea and Japan -- in producing virtually all clean energy technologies, from wind to nuclear power, from high-speed rails to plug-in hybrid cars and the advanced batteries that power them.
The governments of these three nations are expected to invest more than $500 billion over the next five years to extend their lead in clean technology products and applications. That's enough to out-invest the U.S. by a 3-to-1 margin unless this country establishes a national clean energy competitiveness strategy. Devising a strategy and fulfilling the vision is feasible, and there is historical precedent to prove it.
When the U.S. faced global competitors willing to invest enormous sums to dominate defense and information technologies during the Cold War, the nation's response was bold and proactive.
Our government introduced procurement programs, policies and incentives that provided strong demand for emerging information technology, semiconductor and computing technologies, while U.S. investments in research and education provided the human capital needed to block the threat. These investments sparked the IT revolution and helped create economic clusters such as Silicon Valley that have given the U.S. an enduring competitive edge.
Today, government investment is determining the location of the new "Silicon Valleys" of clean technology -- in China. One Chinese city, Baoding, is home to more than 200 renewable energy companies. Dubbed "Electricity Valley," the city is a national clean energy hub, linking manufacturing to research institutions and public policy.
In contrast to the investments made by the U.S. government during the Cold War era, the U.S. response to today's clean energy race has not been mobilized, threatening the promise of a new wave of American prosperity fueled by emerging clean energy industries and jobs.
On Jan. 8, President Barack Obama announced $2.3 billion of funding from the economic stimulus for the "domestic manufacturing of advanced clean energy technologies," according to an administration official. While these steps toward a clean energy economy are potentially consequential, energy and climate legislation working its way through Congress is more focused on limiting pollution than continuing the investments needed to secure our nation's competitiveness.
We need an integrated strategy, combining the insights and vision of industry, government, academia, utilities and consumers. This approach will facilitate the investment climate required to ensure stability and long-term demand for renewable energy.
There's room for another "Silicon Valley" of clean technology outside of China. The U.S. can close the investment gap with Asia and provide direct support for its clean tech research and innovation, manufacturing capacity and domestic markets if we pursue a long-term national clean energy competitiveness strategy. Robust and targeted public investments such as the ones committed recently by Obama can pave the way to a new era of U.S. technology leadership and economic prosperity -- but only if we act now.
Gay is president of Applied Solar at Applied Materials. Shellenberger is president and Nordhaus is chairman of the Breakthrough Institute.
European and Asian high-speed rail manufacturers are courting U.S. government officials in hopes of securing contracts for some of the $8 billion dollars of federal stimulus funds ear-marked for domestic high-speed rail (HSR) projects. Notably absent from the list of companies vying for the cash are American companies. Without the development of a domestic high-speed rail manufacturing base, much of the HSR technology and expertise will continue to come from overseas, with many of the new jobs being created overseas as well.
European and Asian high-speed rail manufacturers are courting U.S. government officials in hopes of securing contracts for some of the $8 billion dollars of federal stimulus funds ear-marked for domestic high-speed rail (HSR) projects.
According to Greenwire, foreign manufacturers are hosting country visits for federal and state government officials to see their high-speed train technologies, as well as dropping not-so-subtle hints that they will build new domestic manufacturing facilities, or expand existing ones, if they are awarded contracts.
States are also feverishly competing for federal funds. According to NPR, forty states and the District of Columbia have already filed applications requesting more than $100 billion for high-speed rail projects. The most ambitious project is a proposed $40 billion, 800-mile HSR network in California spanning from Sacramento to San Diego. Although the Federal Railroad Administration has yet to award any of the $8 billion in government funds to any state or project, companies from Germany, France, Canada, Japan, and China are hoping that early efforts to charm government officials will pay off down the road.
Notably absent from those promoting their HSR technologies are American companies. That's because the United States ceded international leadership in the transportation technology in the 1960s, when Japan became the first nation to construct a national high-speed rail network.
Benchmarking clean-tech competitiveness: A new report by the Breakthrough Institute and Information Technology & Innovation Foundation provides the first comprehensive analysis of competitive positions among the U.S. and key Asian challengers in the global clean energy race.
The report examines the competitive position of each nation in core clean energy technologies, including solar, wind, and nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, advanced vehicles and batteries, and high-speed rail, as well as the government strategies each nation hopes will strengthen its position in the global clean technology sector. The report also offers recommendations for U.S. federal policymakers for regaining U.S. competitiveness.
Cross-posted from Roger Pielke Jr.'s blog In an op-ed in the Washington Post today, Bjorn Lomborg summarizes parts of my Mamizu Climate Policy paper on Japan's emissions reductions targets (here in PDF). [Note to Bjorn, it is appropriate to acknowledge...
In an op-ed in the Washington Post today, Bjorn Lomborg summarizes parts of my Mamizu Climate Policy paper on Japan's emissions reductions targets (here in PDF). [Note to Bjorn, it is appropriate to acknowledge sources, even in an op-ed.] In this op-ed Lomborg is defending coal, or attacking those who wish to decarbonize, or defending free trade . . . or something. A few weeks ago Lomborg was championing geoengineering, this week he is defending coal.
Lomborg cited some data from my Mamizu Climate Policy paper, but neglected the conclusions, which are as follows:
If climate policy is to be about more than symbolic exhortation, then it will necessary for goals to be more than aspirational. Japan's Mamizu climate policy targets for 2020 and 2050 announced in mid-2009 were exceedingly ambitious, and if they are to be criticized, it should be for being too aggressive, not too weak. Should Japan actually succeed with respect to a short-term target of the magnitude implied by the Mamizu climate policy, then it will have achieved a carbon intensity of its economy lower than that of France in 2006 by the end of the decade, representing a decrease in emissions per unit of GDP of about 33%. If the world economy were to be as carbon efficient as implied by Japan's 2020 target, then global carbon dioxide emissions in 2006 would have been only 40% of their actual value.
Regardless of the nature of changes to the composition of the Japanese government in the future, there is considerable merit in encouraging Japan to actively seek to achieve its Mamizu climate policy because its successes and shortfalls will provide a valuable body of experience to other countries seeking to achieve similar goals. Should Japan choose to depart from its proposed Mamizu climate policy to one based on (even more) impossible targets and timetables than they may find themselves the subject of international applause rather than condemnation. At the same time such a shift would signify a desire to meet the symbolic needs of international climate politics while sacrificing the practical challenge of decarbonization policy. Conventional approaches to climate policy have thus far borne little fruit, but that is a topic that goes well beyond this brief analysis. Diversity in climate policy should be encouraged.
A Japanese think tank recently released a paper commenting on the recently-elected DPJ's adoption of aggressive emissions reduction targets and discusses the international implications of such bold climate policy
Akihiro Sawa of the 21st Century Public Policy Institute, a think tank in Japan, has written an interesting paper on the new Japanese government's (the DPJ) proposed climate policies. The paper also has some interesting views on how the United States is viewed in Japan. The paper has just been translated into English as is available here in PDF.
Here is what Prof. Sawa says about Japan's policy, (note that "clear water" refers to Japan's Mamizu climate policy that I discuss in this paper in PDF):
The DPJ has forgotten (or perhaps, are not aware?) that many major developing countries appreciated Prime Minister Taro Aso‟s genuine "clear water" target of reducing 15% compared with 2005 levels (which would be achieved solely by domestic efforts, not employing overseas credits, or offsets), and that these countries have also criticized the EU for including offsets and other developed countries such as Australia for "cheating." Councilor Fukushima mentioned the possibility that "the 25% target may not be a "clear water" target." If this is true, Japan may have disappointed South Africa and Bangladesh, which were supportive of Japan‟s "clear water target" as a criterion proving the sincerity of its reduction efforts, and government authorities of China and India, which have been critical of the excessive use of offsets by developed economies. We would hope that a leader of government charged with severe international negotiations would be more prudent of what he says, as any statement he makes, even domestically, is bound to eventually reach all governments via their embassies.
Perhaps the DPJ's intention was to impress developing countries by setting out the 25% reduction initiative as a sign of Japan‟s enthusiasm towards large reductions. However, at the current global negotiation table, developing countries led by China and India are not ready to give up their demands for reductions in developed economies by 40-80％ - far beyond 25%. Although Councilor Fukuyama mentioned that reduction efforts are meaningless without the participation of China and India, saying that the government would "strongly urge" their involvement, it is hard to conceive that two countries which have maintained a hard-line stance so far in global negotiations, which are not always based on good intentions, would be so easily "urged" to assume a reduction target.
They are, however, very likely to escalate their demands, applauding Japan's competence - its unprecedented declaration of a high reduction target exceeding the capacity of all other countries and its positive outlook that the more stringent the target is, the more innovation is promoted, and hence a stronger economy. They would suggest that in order to accelerate economic recovery, Japan might seek an even higher target which would fulfill their demands of reductions by 40% or more. Would the DPJ be ready to accommodate such demands? Or, would they respond that 40% would be impossible even in their best efforts? If so, what makes 25% a viable figure, and 40%, not? If in turn, China and India should insist on a 40% reduction target as a nonnegotiable condition for their involvement, would the DPJ assent to the 40% reduction target alone, regardless of US and EU resistance? If not, the DPJ would leave developing countries in great despair.
The major problem with the 25% reduction initiative is that it was announced without any diplomatic strategies to convince developing countries to abandon their severe demands and has unnecessarily raised their expectations.
Japan's new government has set forth a strong goal for emissions reductions by 2020, but admits that it really doesn't know how it is going to meet that goal:
Environment Minister Sakihito Ozawa said Sunday that Japan's new goal for cutting greenhouse gas emissions will put the country in a strong position at international negotiations on climate change. But details of how the government will achieve the ambitious goal of reducing emissions by 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020 has yet to be crafted within the new government, Ozawa admitted.
Meantime, my paper evaluating Japan's Mamizu climate policy has been provisionally accepted for publication. I'll post up the final pre-publication version by tomorrow once I finalize and submit. Meantime, here is how I conclude the paper:
If climate policy is to be about more than symbolic exhortation, then it will necessary for goals to be more than aspirational. Japan's Mamizu climate policy targets for 2020 and 2050 announced in mid-2009 were exceedingly ambitious, and if they are to be criticized, it should be for being too aggressive, not too weak. Should Japan actually succeed with respect to its short-term target then it will have achieved a carbon intensity of its economy lower than that of France in 2006 by the end of the decade, representing a decrease in emissions per unit of GDP of about 33%. If the world economy were to be as carbon efficient as implied by Japan's 2020 target, then global carbon dioxide emissions in 2006 would have been only 40% of their actual value.
Regardless of the nature of changes to the composition of the Japanese government in coming months and years, there is considerable merit in encouraging Japan to actively seek to achieve its Mamizu climate policy because its successes and shortfalls will provide a valuable body of experience to other countries seeking to achieve similar goals. Should Japan choose to depart from its proposed Mamizu climate policy to one based on (even more) impossible targets and timetables than they may find themselves the subject of international applause rather than condemnation. At the same time such a shift would signify a desire to meet the symbolic needs of international climate politics while sacrificing the practical challenge of decarbonization policy. Conventional approaches to climate policy have thus far borne little fruit, but that is a topic that goes well beyond this brief analysis. Diversity in climate policy should be encouraged.
Pielke, Jr., R.A., 2009 (provisionally accepted). Mamizu Climate Policy: An Evaluation of Japanese Carbon Emissions Reduction Targets, Environmental Research Letters.
Realizing the economic benefits of a thriving clean technology sector, the new Japanese government seems likely to make its clean energy investment proposals the centerpiece of its energy policy - a potential boost to the nation's competitiveness in the clean energy race
Elected less than a week ago, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) may be new to power but according to a recent Bloomberg piece, it has already acknowledged the urgency of the clean energy race. Centered on an aggressive target to reduce carbon emissions 25% by 2020 from 1990 levels and increasing the share of renewables to 10% of its energy mix by 2020, the DPJ has set forth a proposal to achieve those cuts that is on course to outdo its predecessor, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in both promise and execution.
While many nations' emissions targets end up as nothing more than empty promises, the DPJ's proposal outlines plans that include direct investment in clean energy technology that could have a variety of positive impacts on Japan's clean energy sector and ultimately improve its ability to compete in the clean energy race.
With the intent to expand and improve upon the LDP's clean energy deployment initiatives and grow the share of renewables in its energy mix, the DPJ is offering increased subsidies for solar photovoltaics as well as planning to extend Japan's soon-to-be feed-in tariff system, to include all renewables, instead of just solar.
