Obama's focus on energy innovation and the regulation of conventional pollutants, rather than climate science and carbon pricing, is part of a growing climate centrism that could hold bipartisan support on addressing issues related to climate change.
In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama tacitly acknowledged how politically toxic climate change had become by not mentioning it once. His move angered many environmentalists who insisted there could be no significant action without a full-throated defense of the climate science against skeptics.
But one year later, President Obama's shift can be understood as part of a new climate centrism, one focused less on climate science and carbon pricing and more on energy innovation and the regulation of conventional pollutants like mercury. In his 2012 address, Obama briefly mentioned the divisiveness of climate change as a segue to touting his energy policies.
Polls show that Obama's call for continued energy innovation funding was one of the most popular elements of his speech. Meanwhile, the EPA's new mercury regulations—which will result in the shuttering of some of America's dirtiest coal plants—have long been more popular with Independents and Republicans than carbon regulations.
These policies have a growing number of supporters on the right. Last week, John Tierney of the New York Times pointed to a new study in Science that touted the climate benefits of dealing with non-carbon pollutants:
After looking at hundreds of ways to control these pollutants, the researchers determined the 14 most effective measures for reducing climate change, like encouraging a switch to cleaner diesel engines and cookstoves, building more efficient kilns and coke ovens, capturing methane at landfills and oil wells, and reducing methane emissions from rice paddies by draining them more often.
It is time to take stock of our current climate trajectory, and consider what it means for climate policy. In Part 1 of this week long series, we argued that our current climate trajectory means we must 1) redouble efforts to reduce CO2 emissions as quickly as possible, and 2) we must proactively build resilience to the uncertain impacts of a changing climate. Part 2 examined why voluntary economic contraction is a not a viable strategy for reducing emissions “as quickly as possible.” Part 3 explains why implementing a robust clean energy innovation strategy is the key way to making clean energy cheaper than fossil fuels, thus enable rapid adoption of low-carbon energy sources and drastically reducing CO2 as quickly as possible.
As we wrote in Part 1 and Part 2 of this series, our current climate trajectory and global political economy dictates that the only way we can limit potentially dangerous climate change impacts, above the dangerous impacts we’re already locked into, is to redouble efforts to reduce global CO2 emissions as quickly as possible. To rapidly decarbonize the economy requires greatly accelerating the replacement of fossil fuels with low or zero-carbon clean energy substitutes. Implementing the right strategies to do so raises numerous stark policy choices and issues.
The most fundamental issue is that energy is largely a fungible commodity – the electricity coming out of your wall socket doesn’t have any immediately tangible differences whether it comes from a coal plant or a wind farm. The only immediate difference is cost. This key reality means that the rate of adoption for new clean energy technologies is largely moderated by two principal levers:
(1) The level of public tolerance for paying for the cost of cleaner energy in the form of higher energy costs, subsidies, or reduced economic welfare; and
(2) The cost competitiveness of clean energy compared to fossil fuels.
David Roberts at Grist.org argues that the "brutal logic" of climate change demands we trade economic growth in the world's developed nations for a little more climate breathing room. Is voluntary economic contraction a viable climate solution?
It is time to take stock of our current climate trajectory, and consider what it means for climate policy. In Part 1 of this week long series, we argued that our current climate trajectory means we must 1) redouble efforts to reduce CO2 emissions as quickly as possible, and 2) we must proactively build resilience to the uncertain impacts of a changing climate. Part 2 in this series examines whether voluntary economic contraction is a key strategy in reducing emissions “as quickly as possible.”
In a recent commentary, Grist’s David Roberts notes that our current climate trajectory puts us on a path to dangerous climate impacts, demanding that we must reduce emissions dramatically over the near-term. His proposed strategy to reduce emissions as quickly as possible constitutes an “all-hands-on-deck mobilization” (including a carbon tax, efficiency standards, subsidies, tech development). He also argues that the time has come to consider “shared sacrifice” in the world’s wealthiest nations: a course of voluntary economic contraction in developed economies (thus reducing fossil energy consumption), while allowing developing nations time to shift from dirty to clean energy.
As we wrote in Part 1 of this series, we firmly agree that our climate trajectory demands that we redouble efforts to reduce global CO2 emissions as quickly as possible. They key question remains: what levers or strategies are central to determining how quickly we can reduce emissions. Is voluntary economic contraction a key climate strategy?
By Dr. Harry Saunders, Breakthrough Institute Senior Fellow
Recent posts by the CO2 Scorecard group claim to have discredited the analysis on rebound effects in industrial sectors of the US economy presented in one of my recent papers--let me here call it "Saunders." The authors offer an analysis of their own said to "devastate" the results I have reported there. Herewith is my response.
The Stakes
It is worth reminding readers of the stakes here. The energy consumption forecasts relied on by the IPCC, the IEA and McKinsey ignore rebound effects, or--to be maximally generous--treat them very inadequately. To the extent ignoring rebound effects results in underestimates of future energy use, it means we have less time than is generally believed to devise climate change solutions. This is surely problematic, but no serious individual would dispute the contention that uncomfortable reality must always trump wishful thinking. I believe rebound effects are significant and quite large, and I believe the peer-reviewed literature, including my own extensive contributions to that literature, supports this view. Unfortunately.
And to be absolutely clear: energy efficiency is a good thing (for one thing increasing economic welfare) and must be aggressively pursued; this has always been my position. It's just that it may not deliver the large reductions in energy use many (including myself) would hope for.
Editors note: for more background and reading on rebound effects see...
In light of the above, the CO2 Scorecard posts on this subject (1 and 2) are disappointing and disheartening. But they require a response, even if only to defend the honor of my fellow scholars in this field. A complete dissection of the CO2 Scorecard analysis would make this post too long. Rebound analysis, done properly, is a highly technical undertaking. The approach here is to show a handful of the serious problems with the authors' analysis by way of listing five points, with links to an appendix containing the technical foundation for these points. Those interested in further evaluating this foundation can link to the technical discussion; those interested only in the claims made here can skip the full technicalities. Either way, as you will see, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the authors of the CO2 Scorecard analysis are guessing at what they hope are problems with the Saunders analysis but then have not bothered to check if their guesses are actually right...
Because automobiles are bigger and more powerful than they were three decades ago, major innovations in fuel efficiency have only produced minor gains in gas mileage, another clear example of rebound effects at work.
Automotive engines steadily improved in efficiency by roughly 60 percent from 1980 to 2006, according to a new study by MIT economist Christopher Knittel. That means we could already be driving cars that get an average of 37 miles per gallon (MPG), well above today's average of 27 MPG. The catch, points out Reason's Ronald Bailey: we'd have to be driving cars with the same average weight and power as the average car on the road in 1980.
Instead, consumers took the majority of the improvements in engine efficiency over the last three decades to enjoy larger and more powerful cars (e.g. increasing their use of energy services) rather than reduce energy use, according Knittel's paper, published in American Economic Review.
As Reason's Bailey notes, "This seems an example of the energy rebound effect in which increased energy efficiency encourages people to use even more energy; in this case to fuel bigger and peppier cars."
If vehicle weight and average power had held constant from 1980 to 2006, Knittel estimates that vehicles today would be roughly 60 percent more efficient than they were in the '80s. Instead, average fuel economy of new vehicles sold in the United States improved just 15 percent over this period.
The reason is clear: consumers chose to take these improvements in engine efficiency as a major increase in average vehicle weight, which rose 26 percent, and a doubling of average horsepower, which rose 106 percent from 1980 to 2006.
"Most of that technological progress has gone into [compensating for increased] weight and horsepower," notes Knittel.
Before adjourning to watch yule logs and eat holiday hams, Congress actually managed to pass a 2012 budget bill. ITIF's Matthew Stepp provided us with an early analysis of the bill's impact on energy innovation funding. Funding for key Department of Energy (DOE) innovation offices are up by a modest 2.5 percent relative to the 2011 budget, with impacts on specific programs summarized in the table below...
The Fiscal Year 2012 budget dedicates $768 million to the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, a nearly 6 percent increase from FY2011 levels. As with overall funding for DOE innovation offices, the 2012 budget thus halts and begins to reverse the declines in federal energy innovation funding initiated in the 2011 budget, which saw nuclear energy funding fall 15 percent (or $132 million) from 2010 budget appropriations.
Oblique strategies appear to be working to reduce CO2 emissions. New rules from the EPA to limit emissions of the neurotoxin mercury and other toxic and carcinogenic pollutants from the nation's coal-fired power plants represents a small, but real, step forward toward a cleaner, healthier, and lower-carbon energy system.
The Environmental Protection Agency unveiled new (and long-overdue) regulations today to rein in mercury and other toxic pollutants from coal and oil-fired power plants. The new mercury rules, designed to save lives and protect children from the potent neurotoxin, are likely to trigger the closure of many of America's oldest, dirtiest coal-fired power plants over the next decade.
If and when the new rule takes effect, it will be the first time the federal government has enforced limits on mercury, arsenic, acid gases and other poisonous and carcinogenic chemicals emitted by the burning of fossil fuels.
Lisa P. Jackson, the E.P.A. administrator, said that the regulations, which have taken more than 20 years to formulate, will save thousands of lives and return financial benefits many times their estimated $11 billion annual cost. ...
Mercury is a potent neurotoxin, harming the nervous systems of fetuses and young children and causing lifelong developmental problems. Other pollutants covered by the new rule, including dioxin, can cause cancer, premature death, heart disease, and asthma.
Power plants generally will have up to four years to comply, although waivers can be granted in individual cases to ensure that the lights stay on. The EPA estimates that utilities will be forced to retire plants that currently provide less than one-half of 1 percent of the nation's total generating capacity.
In this sense, the EPA's new pollution rules appear to be another example of the ongoing success of "oblique" strategies to reduce climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions. While the new rules may only force the closure of 0.5 percent of the nation's electricity generating fleet, those plants will be among the least efficient and most carbon-intensive power plants in the nation. The coal-fired power plants most likely to be retired in the face of new pollution regulations emit at least twice as much CO2 per kilowatt-hour of electricity as the national average.
This is a small step forward on climate, but a real one, strongly justified on public health grounds alone, even before any climate benefits are considered. The new rules will eliminate "up to 17,000 premature deaths" per year, along with thousands of heart attacks, asthma attacks and emergency room visits, according to EPA estimates.
By Matthew Stepp, Clean Energy Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and 2010 Breakthrough Generation Fellow." Originally published at the ITIF Blog.
The FY2012 Omnibus Appropriations bill, passed through the House and Senate conference committee last week, provides a small 2.5 percent increase in DOE energy innovation investment-related Offices and programs compared to FY2011. The budget includes key investments for new Energy Innovation Hubs, next-generation small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) RD&D and licensing programs, as well as a boost in funding for ARPA-E. Compared to the roughly $800 million cut to energy innovation investments in FY2011 and the additional cuts sought in the House version of the appropriations bill, the FY2012 budget provides renewed, albeit modest, government support for developing affordable and viable clean energy technologies.
To be clear, the 2012 federal budget still falls short of FY2010's peak in energy innovation investments made through the Stimulus and represents only 72 percent of what the President requested for next year. It's vital that more work is done to increase public investments in clean energy innovation, as the government must play an energetic role in supporting the development of next-generation technologies. However, the FY2012 budget does take steps to stabilize, and in some cases boost, high-impact clean energy investments (Figure 1, below). Below are a few of the highlights:
In a new report from the Breakthrough Institute Energy and Climate Program, we document the challenges facing American energy entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize advanced energy technologies to enhance US energy, economic, and environmental security. Innovative public policy solutions are needed to support private sector innovation and overcome the "valleys of death" that trap too many promising advanced energy ventures.
The United States faces an urgent national imperative to modernize and diversify its energy system by developing and deploying clean, and affordable advanced energy technologies. Domestically, developing new energy supplies and ensuring affordable energy prices will bolster American competitiveness and economic growth. Reducing the cost of advanced energy technologies is the key to finally ending a dependence on volatile global oil markets that holds the American economy hostage, compromises our foreign policy, and bleeds more than a billion dollars a day out of the US economy.
Abroad, the military has already begun deploying innovative clean energy technologies to reduce the high cost, paid in both lives and money, associated with transporting fossil fuels across war zones. Moreover, the impending risks posed by climate change compel the accelerated improvement and widespread deployment of low-carbon energy technologies. Countries around the world are already recognizing the critical need for new advanced energy technologies and are positioning themselves to lead the next wave of energy innovation.
Global energy demand is rising steadily, straining the ability of conventional energy systems to keep pace. For security, economic, and environmental reasons, the global energy system is thus modernizing and diversifying. Developing and developed nations alike are seeking new forms of advanced energy technologies that reduce dependence on foreign nations, insulate economies from volatile energy markets, and are cleaner and thus less costly from a public health perspective. Supplying this $5 trillion global energy market with reliable and affordable clean energy technologies thus represents one of the most significant market opportunities of the 21st century.
Despite this clear energy innovation imperative, the United States and the world remain overly reliant on conventional fuels and exposed to the price volatility and persistent public health impacts that reliance entails. The necessary course of energy modernization remains impeded by the high cost and barriers to scalability of today's clean energy technologies. These are barriers that only innovation can overcome.
However, two obstacles currently block the progress of energy innovation, obstacles which can only be addressed through effective public policy. Due to pervasive market barriers, private sector financing is typically unavailable to bring new energy innovations from early-stage laboratory research to proof-of-concept prototype and on to full commercial scale. This leads to two market gaps that kill off too many promising new energy technologies in the cradle. These gaps are known as the early-stage "Technological Valley of Death" and the later-stage "Commercialization Valley of Death." This pair of barriers is endemic to most innovative technologies yet is particularly acute in the energy sector. As a result, many innovative energy prototypes never make it to the marketplace and never have a chance to compete with established energy technologies. These valleys of death particularly plague capital-starved start-ups and entrepreneurial small and medium-sized firms, the very same innovators that are so often at the heart of American economic vitality.
In effect, the current lack of public policy to address this pair of barriers acts to protect today's well entrenched incumbent technologies from full market competition, while hamstringing American entrepreneurs and innovative ventures seeking to develop and deploy advanced energy technologies. The implementation of creative policies to effectively deal with the Technological and Commercialization Valleys of Death will foster vibrant competition in the energy sector and help drive technological innovation and job creation throughout the economy as a whole.
In the past, the United States has driven immense and far-reaching technological transformations. As the pioneering global innovator of the 20th century, the United States built the world's largest economy because of the ingenuity and creative enterprise of its entrepreneurs and citizens. Each step of the way, proactive public policy has played a crucial role in driving American innovations, from railroads and jet engines to microchips, biotechnology, and the Internet, unleashing long waves of economic growth and shared prosperity. New and advanced clean energy technologies afford the same opportunities to the United States today--if public policy is shaped in a way that allows American innovators to thrive once again.
Energy Secretary Steven Chu will appear today before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation to answer questions on the DOE Loan Program Office. While there are important questions to answer regarding the role of government in technology investment and energy innovation, these questions are unlikely to be the main subject of today's hearing.
What was the original purpose of the Section 1705 loan guarantee program, and what was the expected impact on federal budgets and taxpayers?
In 2009, Section 1705 was added to the DOE Loan Programs Office (LPO), established by the bipartisan Energy Policy Act of 2005. The program was originally appropriated $6 billion in federal funds to provide reserves to cover expected losses on a portion of the loans issued by the agency. This $6 billion would be leveraged to offer a significantly higher loan guarantee volume, unlocking substantial debt finance that would be supplied by private banks. The original $6 billion in funding was raided by Congress to provide funds for the Cash-for-Clunkers program in 2009, however, and ultimately 1705 ended up with a $2.5 billion pool to cover expected loan losses.
Congressional investigators should prioritize clean energy commercialization solutions over political grandstanding and focus on identifying key lessons from the experience of the Loan Programs Office. Congress should put these lessons to immediate use to reform federal involvement in clean energy commercialization and establish a new Clean Energy Deployment Administration.
Step right up to see the latest chapter in the ongoing political circus surrounding the bankruptcy of solar manufacturer and federal loan guarantee recipient Solyndra. Today's main attraction: Secretary of Energy Steven Chu's long-awaited appearance before the eager Republican members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
Key questions remain about the ill-fated solar manufacturer's dramatic demise earlier this year. Unfortunately, investigations on the Hill long ago veered into the realm of political point-scoring, rather than a serious inquiry designed to improve federal support for nascent and nationally-critical clean energy technologies.
Taking a step back from the circus on the Hill, let's make two things very clear.
First, the global energy system is modernizing and diversifying. For an array of motivations from public health and climate change to security and economic growth, today's economies demand a 21st century suite of clean and reliable energy technologies to supply the $5 trillion-and-growing global energy market.
Second, the DOE Loan Programs Office was never particularly well equipped to effectively address the "Commercialization Valley of Death"--the persistent lack of risk-tolerant capital that plagues American innovators and entrepreneurs working valiantly to improve the nation's energy, economic, and environmental security.
In the wake of Solyndra's failure, pundits have latched on to a simple, compelling narrative: government can't do energy right.
From synfuels to solar panels to "clean coal" (written, inevitably, with knowing quotation marks), demonstration projects funded by the Department of Energy are described as one failed white elephant after another. Today the DOE is the agency everyone loves to hate (and, at least in Texas Gov. Rick Perry's case, the agency to forget).
What gets left out (and forgotten) is that virtually every one of today's major energy technologies exists thanks to sustained US government investments in research, development, and demonstration. Consider:
Solar panels were pioneered by NASA, and have seen massive price declines thanks to government research, development, and deployment. Industry leader First Solar is a direct descendant of DOE research as are Nanosolar and GE's thin film solar division.
The global market for clean energy products grew to $243 billion in 2010, a year in which China and Germany both captured a greater share of this global investment than the United States. That has led many (myself included) to worry about the erosion of US competitiveness in a set of clean energy technology products--from solar and wind to nuclear and advanced batteries--originally invented in America.
Yet this growing market for clean tech is almost entirely dependent upon public subsidy and policy support. To be blunt: today's clean energy markets are artificial, and without perpetual policy support, conventional clean energy products could not compete in most global energy markets.
Across the globe, cash-strapped governments and recession-hit publics are pulling back clean energy subsidies, revealing the ephemeral nature of today's clean tech markets. In the last year, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom have all slashed feed-in tariffs for solar and certain other clean energy technologies. In America, expiring tax credits and fading stimulus investments are set to send federal clean tech expenditures plunging 75 percent from 2009 to 2014, according to our research.
There are a hostof reasons why targeted policies and smart public investments in emerging clean tech sectors are justified. But clean tech business leaders and policymakers alike must be crystal clear: the true economic rewards in clean energy industries will not come from producing technology for subsidy-created markets that vacillate wildly with the public mood and the business cycle.
Without substantial innovation to improve the performance and reduce the cost of clean energy technologies, the promise that the clean energy sector might become economically viable, much less a cornerstone of American economic revival, will never be realized. The real clean energy race is thus to invent, commercialize, progressively improve, and mass-produce cheap and reliable clean energy technologies that can compete on cost not just with international competitors but also with fossil fuels.
In short, the race is to make clean energy cheap and subsidy-independent.
Now, new studies .. are again suggesting that modern efforts to improve energy efficiency could lead to big rebound effects; they're touching a nerve and prompting debate in energy and climate circles. Governments and think tanks have launched studies of the paradox, and stories in the New Yorker and New York Times have even suggested that energy efficiency, far from being a savior, could actually be bad for the environment. "The stakes are actually pretty high," says Roland Geyer, professor of industrial ecology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and coauthor of a recent review of the rebound literature.
Dr. Geyer is right: the stakes are quite high.
As Breakthrough Institute documents in our comprehensive review of the academic literature on energy efficiency and rebound effects, "Energy Emergence" (February 2011), most climate mitigation strategies and national energy policies assume that significant gains can be made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and national energy imports at little to no cost or even positive economic gain, chiefly by pursuing "below-cost" energy efficiency measures -- improvements that more than pay for themselves through energy savings over time. The International Energy Agency, for example, counsels global policy makers that energy efficiency can accomplish more than half (58 percent) of all global greenhouse gas emissions reductions needed by 2050 in order to put the world on track to a stable climate (see image at right).
Yet rebound effects mean that for every two steps forward we take towards climate mitigation via below-cost efficiency measures, we take one or more steps backwards through rebound effects. And conventional climate mitigation scenarios, including the IEA's and IPCC's, ignore or incompletely and improperly consider rebound effects in their analysis.
If we follow such a course, and ignore rebound effects, the globe will be dangerously over-reliant on energy efficiency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Even if rebound effects erode just one-third to one-half of the initially expected savings, the globe could fall 20 to 30 percent short of needed emissions cuts, if the IEA's mitigation plan is followed. Further, such a shortfall means the time available to devise additional remedies is reduced, increasing the urgency of the clean energy supply-side challenge.
A new report co-authored by progressive environmentalists, Friends of the Earth, and consumer advocates, Public Citizen, not only misses the mark, it "makes fundamentally misguided choices would be counterproductive to reducing the budget deficit and could potentially exacerbate America's climate and energy challenges".
This post was co-authored by Matthew Stepp, Clean Energy Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), and Teryn Norris, President of Americans for Energy Leadership. Originally published at Americans for Energy Leadership.
In the aftermath of the debt ceiling crisis and as the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction seeks a second budget deal, many public interest groups are working hard to ensure that even while Congress cuts wasteful spending, it preserves vital public programs and expands smart investments in the nation's future. In the energy and climate policy community, a broad range of groups are fighting to defend clean technology investment programs - such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E) - that have taken years to establish and offer a glimmer of hope amidst a largely bleak political and policy landscape.
Other organizations are taking a different approach. This week, two progressive groups - the environmental Friends of the Earth and consumer advocacy group Public Citizen - drew attention when they joined the libertarian Heartland Institute and deficit-hawk Taxpayer for Common Sense in releasing a spending cut plan. In a report called "Green Scissors 2011," the groups call for $380 billion in spending they identify as "wasteful government subsidies" and "environmentally damaging."
The best way to move forward on climate policy is to not focus on climate at all. "Climate Pragmatism" argues that we can move past the climate wars by focusing on what we already agree on: energy innovation, pollution reduction, and resilience to extreme weather.
The best way to move forward on climate policy is to not focus on climate at all.
That's the conclusion of new report by authors from Oxford, London School of Economics, Third Way, the American Enterprise Institute, the Breakthrough Institute and others. Climate Pragmatism argues that we can move past the climate wars by focusing on what we already agree on: energy innovation, pollution reduction, and resilience to extreme weather.
While there is no evidence -- and indeed, great counter-evidence -- that nations can reduce their carbon emissions through caps, there is more than 200 years of evidence of nations moving to cleaner energy, reducing toxic air pollution, and adapting to the climate. These three pillars of climate pragmatism swim with, rather than against, the process of human development and modernization.
The "Climate Pragmatism" paper explodes a myth that's held by many greens: that energy is too cheap. For most of the world, the opposite is true, which is why more than 1.4 billion people lack virtually any access to electricity. That's an astounding figure, but one that rarely gets the attention it deserves. Lack of electricity impacts public health -- try running a modern hospital without any power -- and retards economic growth. If we want developing nations to be better prepared to deal with the effects of climate change -- or just about any other threat -- we need to get them wired.
Where the old climate regime spent 20 years developing a bureaucracy waiting on the two largest emitters -- China and the U.S. -- Climate Pragmatism says that we can get started right away doing more of the things we already agree on and have great experience doing.
Such an approach disappoints climate warriors and partisans. Al Gore, for one, is organizing another day of PowerPoint lectures. But public support for the environment is at more than 30 year-low, cap and trade is dead, perhaps for good, and global warming has become as partisan and polarizing an issue as abortion and gun control.
Climate Pragmatism also comes at a time when national political leaders are moving toward a more pragmatic approach to climate. In the Guardian/Yale360, we argue that Obama's greatest contribution to the environment was moving the Democratic discourse away from global warming apocalypse and toward economic aspiration. Last week, when New York Mayor Bloomberg donated $50 million to anti-coal activism, he pointedly framed his remarks around public health, not climate change.
Climate warriors and skeptics will, to be sure, keep their 20-year feud alive. But they may no longer impede climate progress.
A pragmatic strategy to restart stalled global climate efforts through the pursuit of energy innovation, climate resilience, and no regrets pollution reduction (Report Overview)
Climate Pragmatism, a new policy report released July 26th by the Hartwell group, details an innovative strategy to restart global climate efforts after the collapse of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. This pragmatic strategy centers on efforts to accelerate energy innovation, build resilience to extreme weather, and pursue no regrets pollution reduction measures -- three efforts that each have their own diverse justifications independent of their benefits for climate mitigation and adaptation. As such, Climate Pragmatism offers a framework for renewed American leadership on climate change that's effectiveness, paradoxically, does not depend on any agreement about climate science or the risks posed by uncontrolled greenhouse gases.
The new report brings the Hartwell framework into an American perspective, and it is authored by a broad group of 14 international scholars and analysts representing a diverse range of political and ideological positions -- from the conservative American Enterprise Institute to moderate Democratic think tank Third Way and the liberal Breakthrough Institute.
Climate Pragmatism is the third paper released by the Hartwell group, an informal international network of scholars and analysts dedicated to innovative strategies that uplift human dignity through mitigation of climate risk, enhancement of disaster resilience, improvement of public health, and the provision of universal energy access. Previous publications include The Hartwell Paper (May 2010) and How to Get Climate Policy Back on Course (July 2009).
Climate Pragmatism also builds on the limited and direct energy technology innovation strategy outlined by the Breakthrough Institute along with scholars at the American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institution in the October 2010 policy report, Post-Partisan Power.
As the report's authors explain:
The old climate framework failed because it would have imposed substantial costs associated with climate mitigation policies on developed nations today in exchange for climate benefits far off in the future -- benefits whose attributes, magnitude, timing, and distribution are not knowable with certainty. Since they risked slowing economic growth in many emerging economies, efforts to extend the Kyoto-style UNFCCC framework to developing nations predictably deadlocked as well.
The new framework now emerging will succeed to the degree to which it prioritizes agreements that promise near-term economic, geopolitical, and environmental benefits to political economies around the world, while simultaneously reducing climate forcings, developing clean and affordable energy technologies, and improving societal resilience to climate impacts. This new approach recognizes that continually deadlocked international negotiations and failed domestic policy proposals bring no climate benefit at all. It accepts that only sustained effort to build momentum through politically feasible forms of action will lead to accelerated decarbonization.
In the pages of UNIDO's Making It magazine, Breakthrough's Jesse Jenkins and Harry Saunders explain the impact and implications of the energy demand "rebound effect" spurred on by energy efficiency.
The article builds upon the Breakthrough Institute's "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena", a comprehensive literature review pointing to the expert consensus and evidence that below-cost energy efficiency measures drive a rebound in energy consumption that erodes much of expected energy savings.
Truly cost-effective energy efficiency measures lower the effective price of the services derived from fuel consumption - heating, cooling, transportation, industrial processes, etc. - leading consumers and industry alike to demand more of these services. There are other indirect and economy-wide effects as well, as consumers re-spend money saved through efficiency on other energy-consuming goods and services, industrial sectors adjust to changes in the relative prices of final and intermediate goods, and greater energy productivity causes the economy as a whole to grow. Collectively, these economic mechanisms drive a rebound in demand for energy services that can erode much - and in some cases all - of the expected reductions in total energy use, along with much-hoped-for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, rebound effects are often most pronounced in the productive sectors of the economy, including industry and agriculture, as well as throughout the world's emerging economies.
...
Conventional climate mitigation strategies count on energy efficiency to do a great deal of work. For example, the IEA in a global climate stabilization scenario published by the agency in December 2009, estimates that efficiency measures could account for roughly half of the emissions reductions needed. Yet, from a climate or global resource conservation perspective, rebound effects mean that for every two steps forward taken through greater efficiency, rebounds take us one (or more) steps backwards. This is particularly true throughout the developing world, and in the productive sectors of the global economy.
A clear understanding of rebound effects therefore demands a fundamental re-assessment of energy efficiency's role in global climate mitigation efforts.
A continued failure to accurately and rigorously account for rebound effects risks an over-reliance on the ability of efficiency to deliver lasting reductions in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. Without a greater emphasis on the other key climate mitigation lever at our disposal - the de-carbonization of global energy supplies through the deployment and improvement of low-carbon energy sources - the global community will fall dangerously short of climate mitigation goals.
At the same time, however, we can re-affirm the role of energy efficiency efforts in expanding human welfare and fueling global economic development. Unlocking the full potential of efficiency may very well mean the difference between a richer, more efficient world, and a poorer, less efficient world. The former is clearly the desirable case - even if the world uses more or less the same amount of energy in either scenario.
The pursuit of any and all cost-effective efficiency opportunities should thus continue as a key component of an efficient course for global development, even as we reconsider the degree to which these measures can contribute to climate mitigation efforts.
A large gulf stands between the work of serious energy analysts and a recent essay published by NRDC's analysts, which stubbornly assert that "rebounds at the economy-wide level are trivially small."
Update - 9/2/2011 - Please see corrigendum appended to this post
A recent article in Electricity Policy by Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) analysts (David Goldstein et al.) purports to offer a fresh look at the question of energy consumption rebound resulting from cost-effective efficiency improvements. But rather than advancing the ongoing discussion about rebound among serious energy analysts, NRDC attempts to turn back the clock, relying on outdated and recycled citations dating from as far back as the early 1990s and asserting that conclusions about rebound effects must be testable against "rigorously framed hypotheses" while failing to apply that standard to their own claims regarding the historic success of efficiency policies in reducing energy use.
In reviewing their article, it is difficult to escape the feeling that Goldstein and his colleagues simply ignore any recent work that is inconvenient to their premise, including a rich trove of literature and inquiry into rebound effects published in recent years. It is particularly revealing that the authors restrict their analysis to those sectors of the global energy economy where rebound effects appear to be least significant--end-use consumption in rich, developed economies. In so doing they ignore both the productive sectors of the economy responsible for two-thirds of the global energy use and the emerging economies driving the vast bulk of global energy demand growth--in short those sectors of the global energy economy in which the vast majority of current and future energy demand is concentrated and in which the rebound literature suggests rebound effects are likely to be greatest.
In fact, NRDC's contention that "rebounds at the economy-wide level are trivially small" is controverted by virtually everyreviewof the evidence for energy efficiency rebound conducted in recent years. So while NRDC attempts to re-litigate a decades-old debate, for serious analysts and policymakers, particularly in Europe, this debate, about whether rebound exists and is non-trivial, is effectively over. The focus now is on developing a richer understanding of when and where such effects operate, at what scale, and, increasingly, a focus on what, if anything, can be done to mitigate such phenomena. The UK government, for example, now explicitly considers at least one rebound mechanism when planning efficiency policies. And the European Commission funded a large study in 2011 that begins from the consensus that rebound effects are real and significant, and explores what can done about it.
In the United States, the tone seems to be shifting and signs are appearing that energy researchers are beginning to realize they need to deal forthrightly with this issue. Many who before quite adamantly denied the rebound phenomenon now treat it more cautiously as the academic substantiveness of multiple recent studies becomes apparent. Small working groups of scholars are forming to address the gaps in our knowledge. The Center for Climate and Energy Decision Making at Carnegie Mellon University will soon host a gathering of scholars to define the research questions that call out for serious inquiry. And the latest Stanford Energy Modeling Forum study on energy efficiency (EMF, 2011), while it still overlooks much of the recent literature (perhaps because it was framed a few years ago) nonetheless acknowledges key rebound mechanisms.
The critical question really isn't whether or not rebound effects exist -- as basic economic theory dictates, they most certainly do -- but rather how large they may be in various contexts.
Truly cost-effective energy efficiency measures lower the effective price of the services derived from fuel consumption - heating, cooling, transportation, industrial processes, etc. We know that economic actors react in complex ways to changes in the relative and absolute prices of various goods and services, and in particular, that when prices fall, consumers and industry alike demand more of these services, all else being equal. Other indirect and economy-wide effects can result from efficiency improvements as well, as consumers re-spend money saved through efficiency on other energy-consuming goods and services, industrial sectors adjust to changes in the relative prices of final and intermediate goods, and greater energy productivity causes the economy as a whole to grow. Collectively, these various mechanisms are known as "rebound effects" as they drive a rebound in demand for energy services that significantly erodes reductions in total energy use otherwise expected from efficiency improvements, along with much-hoped-for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In rough terms, for every two steps forward we may take through efficiency, rebound effects take us one (or more) steps backwards.
Unfortunately, conventional forecasts of energy use and the reductions possible through efficiency measures routinely ignore many (if not all) of the various rebound mechanisms. To the extent rebound phenomena are non-trivial, the implication is that the traditional forecasts of global energy use on which so much of climate change policy is reliant may seriously understate the scale of the challenge by ignoring or improperly treating rebound, meaning we have less time than we think to devise climate solutions.
NRDC's entry into this high-stakes debate disappoints on the methodology side, as we discuss in detail below. But the article also reads like an effort to turn back the clock to a time five to ten years ago when many still dismissed the rebound phenomenon as irrelevant, the province of a few fringe theorists, perhaps. This finds its reflection in the outdated citations the analysts rely on, with the most frequently cited report dating from 2005 (IEA/Geller) and reliant in turn upon Greene (1992), itself a survey of even older literature.
The field has progressed substantially since then--especially in Europe.
Perhaps triggered by the exhaustive UK Energy Research Center study of rebound led by Steve Sorrell (2007, 2009), inquiry into rebound effects has since seen noteworthy advances overseas. Significant funding in Europe is now going to researchers examining the problem through multiple analytic methods, and the fruits of these labors are appearing monthly in the literature.
In a statement that NRDC's analysts clearly did not take to heart, Sorrell concluded his rigorous assessment of the literature in 2007 with this statement:
"It would be wrong to assume that, in the absence of evidence, rebound effects are so small that they can be disregarded. Under some circumstances ... economy-wide rebound effects may exceed 50% and could potentially increase energy consumption in the long-term. In other circumstances ... economy-wide rebound effects are likely to be smaller. But in no circumstances are they likely to be zero."
"Rebound effects are real and significant and combine to drive a total, economy-wide rebound in energy demand with the potential to erode much (and in some cases all) of the reductions in energy consumption expected to arise from below-cost efficiency improvements."
While both literature reviews put the state-of-the-art in the field at NRDC's fingertips, their analysts unfortunately opt to merely cite selectively from both works, while ignoring the broad consensus that has developed in the academic literature.
We suggest the NRDC would be better advised to instead climb on board and move without delay up this learning curve. The bright and committed staff and analysts at NRDC have much to contribute to the understanding - and management - of rebound effects.
But as it stands, there are several methodological difficulties with the current NRDC analysis. Two are central:
First, the NRDC paper hangs on an effort to construct and examine "rigorously-testable hypotheses" of rebound, a method they fail to appropriately utilize, while eventually falling afoul of their own requirement for testability of hypotheses in their effort to prove the historic success of efficiency policies in reducing energy use.
Second, the authors make the common error of focusing their arguments on the smallest part of the energy economy--end-use consumption in rich, developed economies. This means they ignore both the productive sector of the economy responsible for two-thirds of the global energy use and the emerging economies driving the vast bulk of global energy demand growth--and the different-in-kind rebound mechanics in play in both places. In such sectors, the shadow of Jevons still lurks (see Jenkins et al. 2011 for survey of key literature).
Other non-methodological difficulties arise in their portrayal of the positions of rebound analysts, possibly due to a failure to undertake the hard work of examining the rich and burgeoning recent literature. Whatever the cause, it leads them to falsely portray key elements of the debate, and to apparently lay claim to new insights that are in fact old ones.
Phasing out the United States' entire nuclear power supply by 2030 would increase the country's carbon dioxide emissions by at least 5% and as much as 13%, depending on what mix of power plants replace the aging nuclear units. If the United States phased out the twenty-three nuclear power plants with the same design as Japan's troubled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex by 2030, carbon dioxide emissions in the United States would increase overall by at least 1 percent.
As the crisis at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex continues to captivate global media attention, President Obama's domestic energy plans, which have long-included a push for the construction of new nuclear reactors, are beginning to be called into question. Two days ago, Senate Democrats demanded a broad review of the safety of the country's nuclear plants, with nine Democrats even seeking to delay legislation to allow the construction of a new plant in Iowa.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts that, by 2030, nuclear power will supply about 18% of the nation's electricity, as compared to roughly 20% in 2011.
Below, we illustrate the consequences for overall United States carbon dioxide emissions if the United States phases out its entire nuclear fleet. Three scenarios project the effect of replacing lost generation either entirely by coal generation, entirely by natural gas generation, or by an equal split of both.
If nuclear power were to be completely taken out of the United States' power supply by 2030, United States carbon emissions would rise by at least 300 million tons over baseline scenarios. Carbon emissions would increase by at least 5% and as much as 13% across the entire economy, while power-sector emissions would soar by 12% to 33%, depending on the mix of replacement power.
The lowest value corresponds to a scenario in which the nuclear plants are replaced by new natural gas-fired units, perhaps the most likely scenario given recent discovery of plentiful new natural gas supplies in North America.
Last update to post at March 29 at 7:00pm, Pacific time; please check timestamps for individual sections below to find out when information was last updated.
Live Updates via Twitter
Track live updates and breaking news relayed via Twitter below. Breakthrough Director of Energy and Climate Policy Jesse Jenkins has been covering the crisis in Japan since it began @JesseJenkins. See this "Nuclear Crisis" list for a curated feed of other sources of news on the nuclear crisis at the damaged Fukushima nuclear power station.
Note: The Twitter widgets have at times been unreliable and if the widgets above do not load properly, click on the links to the direct Twitter pages in the first paragraph above
In the latest in DC's battle over the federal budget, the Senate Democrats released on Friday their plan to fund the government through FY2011, which would make substantial cuts in federal energy innovation across DOE agencies.
While ultimately keeping energy innovation-related spending at a higher level than would the House's Continuing Resolution (CR) (passed two weeks ago), the Senate's plan decreases budgets for each of the DOE's offices involved in energy-innovation as compared to FY2010 appropriations, in sharp contrast to the proposed increases for energy innovation related spending through President Obama's proposed FY2012 budget.
(click to enlarge)
*ARPA-E received $400 million in ARRA funding, to be spent over FY2009 and FY2010, or $200 million per year on average. No additional funding was provided for the agency in regular FY2010 appropriations.
**The estimates for Fossil Energy R&D used in this post refer solely to the Fossil Energy R&D program, rather than Fossil Energy Program as a whole, as Fossil Energy R&D is where energy innovation investments are concentrated.
***For exact figures, see chart at the end of this post.
Although fossil energy sources receive far more federal subsidy than renewables, when compared based on the share of U.S. energy consumption provided, renewable energy sources receive over seven times more subsidy than fossil fuels.
Here's your latest edition of Friday Factoids, (this one a smidgen early)...
A while back, I posted some quick math reminding readers that while pushing to end subsidies for mature, centuries-old fossil fuel technologies is a pretty smart policy, it on it's own will be far from sufficient to make clean energy cost competitive. The global figures come from the International Energy Agency's latest World Energy Outlook and reveal that worldwide, renewable energy sources receive more than twice the subsidy than fossil fuels, when compared based on how much of global energy demand they supply.
Here's a summary of the global figures:
Fossil energy:
Total subsidies (2009) = $312 billion;
Share of global energy consumption provided (2009) = 83 percent;
Subsidy per percentage of global energy consumption provided: $3.8 billion
Renewable energy:
Total subsidies (2009) = $57 billion;
Share of global energy consumption provided (2009) = 7 percent;
Subsidy per percentage of global energy consumption provided: $8.1 billion (Note: excludes conventional hydropower and biomass)
Compared on a per unit of energy provided basis, renewables therefore receive 2.1x more government subsidies than fossil fuels.
Today, we'll add in the U.S. figures, which advantage renewables even more. That's because globally, much of the subsidies provided for fossil fuels are provided in either developing nations or in oil rich Middle Eastern nations, which make it easier for their citizens to purchase fuels through government-funded subsidies for consumer purchases (rather than subsidies for fossil fuel producers; see IEA for more on that).
For the United States:
Fossil energy:
Total subsidies (2002-2008, cumulative): $72.4 billion;
Share of U.S. energy consumption provided (2008): 84.6 percent;
Subsidy per percentage of U.S. energy consumption provided: $0.9 billion.
Renewable energy:
Total subsidies (2002-2008, cumulative): $28.9 billion;
Share of U.S. energy consumption provided (2008): 4.3 percent;
Subsidy per percentage of U.S. energy consumption provided: $6.7 billion. (Note: excludes conventional hydropower)
Compared on a per unit of energy provided basis, renewables therefore receive 7.4x more U.S. federal subsidies than fossil fuels.
Data source: subsidies for Environmental Law Institute, energy cosumption from U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Outlook 2010." Note that subsidy figures are cumulative for the seven years from 2002 to 2008. The per unit subsidy figures for the U.S. should therefore not be strictly compared to the global figures above.
Clearly, ending all subsidies for fossil and renewables alike would not 'even the playing field' for renewables, as some have argued. These figures indicate that fossil energy would still retain quite a distinct price advantage.
Even if we cut all subsidies for fossil fuels, then, we'll need accelerated innovation to fully close the price gap between new renewables and incumbent fossil energy. (For more on that price gap, see a previous installment of our Friday Factoids series here).
China is on a roaring path towards single-handedly swamping any hopes of climate stability. The nation's current climate pledges appear lackadaisical rather than ambitious and just as likely to trigger significant rebounds in energy use than real CO2 reductions. The only way to avert potential climate catastrophe is to de-link economic growth from carbon emissions by fueling China -- and the world -- with clean, affordable, and massively scalable energy technologies. Our current menu of technological options is dangerously short, and there's no time to waste: we must make clean energy cheap, and fast.
I've said it before and I'll say it again: when it comes to the global climate challenge, as goes China, so goes the world.
Driving that aphorism home, co2scorecard.org, a not-for-profit project that closely tracks global greenhouse gas emissions, now reports that China's CO2 emissions increased by 906 million tons in 2009 -- the second largest annual increase for any country in recorded history. China's soaring emissions were enough to completely offset the drop in emissions wrought by the economic havoc plaguing much of the Western world (see graphic below).
China's unprecedented surge in CO2
As Goes China, So Goes the World: Soaring CO2 emissions from energy use in China drive global greenhouse gas trends (click image to enlarge; source: co2scorecard.org)
Over the last decade, China's annual emissions of climate destabilizing CO2 jumped by 5 billion tons per year. According to Shakeb Afsah, President and CEO of co2scorecard.org, that's "the highest [increase in annual CO2 output] for a single country in recorded history, representing an average annual emissions increase of almost 12%--more than four times the rate observed [for China] the previous decade."
To put this unprecedented 5 billion ton increase in annual CO2 emissions in context, Mr Afsah and colleague Kendyl Salcito note that during the 14-year long post-war boom period of 1959-1973, during which U.S. CO2 emissions rose each year, America's annual output of CO2 jumped by only 2 billion tons.
This set of frequently asked questions accompanies a new Breakthrough Institute report, "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena." That report surveys the relevant academic literature and finds extensive evidence that a large amount of the energy savings from below-cost energy efficiency are eroded by demand 'rebound effects.'
On February 17th, Breakthrough Institute released a new, comprehensive survey of the literature and evidence concerning the rebound effects triggered by many energy efficiency improvements.
"Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" explains why energy efficiency measures that truly 'pay for themselves' will lower the cost of energy services -- heating, transportation, industrial processes, etc. -- driving a rebound in energy demand that can erode a significant portion of the expected energy savings and climate benefits of these measures.
This new set of Frequently Asked Questions explains rebound effects, how they operate, what kinds of energy efficiency improvements trigger bigger or smaller rebounds, and why coming to terms with the full scale of rebound challenges the heart of many contemporary climate mitigation strategies.
A: Increasing the efficiency of an energy consumptive activity will lower the cost of the services derived from that activity - that is, it will change the price of the "energy services" derived from the fuels, such as lighting, transportation goods or services, heating or cooling, industrial processes, etc.
Economic actors respond to price changes in two general ways:
Increasing the utilization of that energy service to increase outputs or incomes. For example, a low-income resident may now heat his or her home more often or heat more areas of the home after weatherizing their home, because it is now far more affordable to heat. (In economics speak, this involves 'elasticities of demand,' or the responsiveness of demand to changes in the price of goods and services)
Re-arranging the factors of production or goods and services consumed to substitute now-cheaper energy services for other goods or services (maintaining the same level of output or income). For example, a more efficient heat plant may enable a chemicals plant or metals smelter to raise temperatures in industrial processes to extract high quality product from poorer quality inputs (substituting energy for materials) or to reduce process times (substituting energy for labor). (In economic terms, this involves 'substitution elasticities,' or the ability of firms or consumers to take advantage of lower prices to productively re-arrange the production inputs or consumer goods they utilize).
Both of these dynamics are "rebound effects," a term for any economic mechanism that leads to a rebound, or increase, in demand for energy following an improvement in energy efficiency that lowers the effective cost of that energy service.
There are other rebound effects as well (for a quick description of each, see the summary here). Our report, "Energy Emergence" surveys more than half a dozen distinct rebound mechanisms, some of which are fairly direct (like the two above), others that are more indirect (like the impact of money saved through efficiency measures as it is re-spent in the economy on other goods or services that in turn require energy to produce). Still more effects are only visible in the aggregate, at the macro-economic scale, as economies respond in a variety of ways to widespread improvements in energy efficiency.
A: No, not always. Although in some cases, it is possible that efficiency improvements will "backfire," driving a rebound in energy that fully compensate for the initial energy savings, increasing energy demand overall. While backfire is by no means the norm, it is possible in some cases (we'll explore conditions that are likely to lead to backfire in a later question).
As "Energy Emergence" concludes, "Rebound effects are real and significant, and combine to drive total economy-wide rebound in energy demand with the potential to erode much (and in some cases all) of the reductions in energy consumption expected to arise from below-cost efficiency improvements."
Think of it this way: rebound effects mean that for every two steps forward we take in energy savings through efficiency, rebound effects take us one (and sometimes more) steps backwards. We may still move forward, but not as much as we initially expected.
A: Rebound matters because the magnitude of rebound effects determines how effective below-cost efficiency improvements are at contributing to lasting reductions in total energy use and therefore greenhouse gas emissions.
Energy efficiency has frequently been cited as the single greatest contributor to emissions reduction and climate mitigation strategies, by everyone from the International Energy Agency and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to consultants like Amory Lovins' Rocky Mountain Institute and McKinsey to efficiency advocates and environmental NGOs. The IEA counts on efficiency for roughly half of the emissions reductions needed in their "Blue Map" climate stabilization scenario (graphic below), for example, while President Obama told reporters in 2009 that with efficiency, "we can save as much as 30 percent of our current energy usage."
So we're counting on energy efficiency to do quite a bit of "climate mitigation work," so to speak.
The problem is that all of these estimates are based on an assumption: that energy efficiency reduces energy demand in a linear, direct, and one-for-one manner. An X% gain in efficiency leads to an equivalent X% reduction in total energy use.
But the economy is anything but direct, linear, and simple, especially when responding to changes in the relative price of goods and services. When a good or service or input to production gets cheaper, consumers and firms use more of it, find new cost-effective uses for it, re-invest any savings in other productive activities, and the economy overall gets more productive overall, driving economic growth and activity.
That's the rebound effect, and it means that we can't assume that improving energy efficiency by 20%, for example, will reduce energy demand by 20%.
If we don't accurately and rigorously account for rebound effects, we risk over-relying on energy efficiency to deliver lasting reductions in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, and we will fall dangerously short of climate mitigation goals.
A: Rebound effects differ in scale, depending on the type of energy efficiency improvements we're talking about, and where in the economy we look. In very few cases are rebound effects "very small" or insignificant.
Dozens of academic studies have examined the empirical evidence, conducted modeling inquiries, and otherwise tested the scale of rebound effects. While there is much more work to be done to determine the precise scale and impact of rebound effects in different circumstances, the conclusion is that rebound effects are significant and cannot be ignored in energy and climate analysis and policymaking. See the following three questions for summaries of the scale of rebound in different circumstances...
A: In rich, developed nations, if we improve the efficiency of end-use consumer energy services, like cars, home heating and cooling, or appliances, the literature indicates that direct rebound effects alone are typically on the scale of 10-30% of the initial energy savings. Additional indirect and macroeconomic effects may mean total rebound erodes roughly one quarter to one third of expected energy savings in these situations.
Rebound here is smallest in cases when demand for the energy service in question is already saturated (that is, we use as much of it as we would care to use), and highest in cases where the cost of the energy service is a key constraint on fulfilling demand for that service. For example, if a wealthy homeowner already reliably heats all the rooms in his or her house to 70 degrees, he/she wouldn't increase the thermostat to 77 degrees just because our heating system got 10% more efficient. But if a poorer household can't afford to turn the thermostat up, or only heats one room of the house with a small space heater, because the house is too drafty, then if the house gets weatherized and more efficient, that household is likely to use more energy to heat their home. In general, end-use consumer efficiency improvements in rich, developed economies will still lead to a net savings in energy, although rebound effects shouldn't be ignored even here.
A: No, rebound effects are almost certainly larger in poorer, developing nations.
For efficiency in end-use consumer energy services in developing nations, direct rebound effects alone are likely to be much higher than in richer nations, on the order of 40-80%. Rebound is higher here because demand for energy services is far from saturated, demand is far more elastic (responsive to changes in price), and the cost of energy services is often a key constraint on the enjoyment of energy services. This is important, because growing demand in developing nations is the principal driver of energy demand growth worldwide.
We should be very careful in generalizing our experiences or intuitions about rebound effects in rich, developed nations to the larger bulk of the global population living in developing economies. As Lee Schipper and Michael Grubb wrote in 2000:
"[I]n low-income economies, energy and energy costs are often a constraint on economic activity. ... In short, the shadow of Jevons lurks [in developing nations] for precisely the same reason that more efficient use of coal [in Jevons' Britain] did not save coal: the combined effects of different rebounds are very important when energy availability, energy efficiency, and energy costs are a significant constraint to activity and therefore energy use."
Since expanding the supply of energy services is a key constraint on economic activity in developing nations, the macro-economic impact of efficiency improvements in developing economies is also likely to be more significant, helping developing economies grow faster (and thus consume more energy).
A: While more study of rebound effects for efficiency improvements at producing firms (e.g. industry and commerce) is needed, the literature to date indicates that direct rebound effects may be on the order of 20-70% for these sectors, with additional rebound due to indirect and macroeconomic effects.
Rebound effects in firms depend principally on the ability of firms to rearrange their factors of production (labor, capital, energy, and various materials) to better take advantage of now-cheaper energy services. This is especially true for new productive capacity. If long-term substitution is high, rebound effects can be substantial. In addition, output effects contribute to rebound for energy intensive firms with a high elasticity of demand for their products (that is, where consumers are very responsive to changes in the price of their products and demand more product as the price falls).
Improvements in energy productivity at firms can also contribute to greater economic activity and growth, driving up energy demand overall. In general, rebound effects are higher for efficiency in productive sectors of the economy than for end-use consumer efficiency. This is notable, because two-thirds of the energy consumed in the U.S. is consumed in the productive sectors of the economy and "embedded" in the non-energy goods and services purchased by consumers.
A: Yes. At the economy-wide, macro-economic scale, the aggregate impacts of widespread energy efficiency improvements can lead to substantial rebound effects, as producers and consumers respond in turn to various cascading changes in the price of goods and services, the pace of economic growth quickens, and market prices for fuels may fall, driving a further rebound due to market price effects. Since these economic responses are complex and varied, economic modeling is most often used to estimate the scale of macroeconomic rebound due to aggregate efficiency improvements.
A number of 'Computable General Equilibrium' models (see page 34 of the study) generally show rebound at the scale of a national economy of 30-50% or greater, with a surprising number predicting rebound greater than 100% (aka 'backfire'). These studies look at national economies and thus ignore global, macro-economic impacts beyond national boarders, which can add additional rebound in energy consumption.
'Integrative modeling,' a more detailed approach utilized by energy analysts at Cambridge, found that if the world adopted all of the "no regrets" energy efficiency policies suggested by the International Energy Agency, then rebounds effects would erode more than half of expected savings (52%) in the long-term. There are also several reasons to think this is may be a conservative estimate (see pages 39-40 of the study).
At the macro-economic, global scale most relevant to climate change mitigation efforts, then, rebound effects can be substantial, and erode much (if not all) of the expected energy savings and climate benefits.
A: Rebound is likely to be particularly acute and is most likely to trigger backfire (rebound >100% of initially expected energy savings) in the following cases:
If the supply of energy services is a key constraint on economic activity and growth (as it is in much of the developing world), then improvements in energy efficiency are likely to trigger acute rebound or even backfire. In a world where roughly 1.6 billion people lack access to electricity and 2.5 billion rely primarily on primitive biomass (e.g., wood and dung) for cooking and heating, huge pent-up demand for energy services persists and the availability of energy services will be a major determinant of future rates of economic growth and progress. This in turn indicates potential for very large rebounds for efficiency improvements in developing nations.
When more efficient (and thus lower cost) energy services open up new markets or enable widespread new energy-using applications, products, or even entire new industries to emerge. We dub this dynamic a 'frontier effect' in our report, because in these cases, the 'production-possibility frontier' for an energy-using technology expands significantly, opening up unforeseen opportunities for substitution and potentially significant impacts on economic activity and the composition of the economy. In such cases, backfire is the most likely outcome.
Backfire due to this 'frontier effect' dynamic is most likely to arise for 'general-purpose technologies' that have a wide scope for improvement and elaboration, have potential for use in a wide variety of products and processes, and have strong complementarities with existing or potential new technologies. Examples of 'general-purpose technologies' could include steam engines, electric motors, lighting, gas turbines, semiconductors and computing technologies, lasers, robotics, radio transmitters, and perhaps many others. Backfire is most likely to result after energy efficiency improvements in these general-purpose technologies. (See p. 47-8 of the report.)
These emergent 'frontier effect' dynamics may prove particularly challenging for energy analysts to forecast or account for in modeling efforts, as they necessarily involve unforeseen and unpredictable applications of new and improved technologies. This means that forecasts of rebound can easily underestimate eventual rebound due to frontier effects triggered by sustained efficiency gains.
When energy efficiency improvements not only improve the productivity of energy, but also result in simultaneous improvements in other factors of production, such as labor or capital (a 'multi-factor productivity improvement'), an outsized impact on economic output and significant rebound in energy demand can arise.
Very large rebound or backfire is likely the norm in cases of 'win-win' efficiency opportunities, where energy-saving technical changes simultaneously improve the productivity of other factors of production, multiplying the impacts on output, economic growth and energy demand.
For example, in a 2005 paper, efficiency consultant Amory Lovins writes:
"Improved energy efficiency, especially end-use efficiency, often delivers better services. Efficient houses are more comfortable; efficient lighting systems can look better and help you see better; efficiency motors can be more quiet, reliable, and controllable; efficient refrigerators can keep food fresher for longer; efficient cleanrooms can improve the yield, flexibility, throughput, and setup time of microchip fabrication plants; ... retail sales pressure can rise 40% in well-daylit stores ... Such side- benefits can be one or even two orders of magnitude more valuable than the energy directly saved. ...[I]n efficient buildings, ... labor productivity typically rises by about 6-16%. Since office workers in industrialized countries cost ~100x more than office energy, a 1% increase in labor productivity has the same bottom-line effect as eliminating the energy bill - and the actual gain in labor productivity is ~6-16x bigger than that."
While the multi-factor productivity improvements Lovins describes greatly improve the economic case for energy efficiency upgrades, they simultaneously raise the specter of significantly greater rebound in energy demand than if the improvement in energy productivity were considered alone (as is common in the inquiries discussed in prior sections). If the economic impact of labor productivity improvements from efficient buildings is several orders of magnitude greater than the simultaneous savings in energy consumption, for example, then the rebound due to economic growth/output effects alone should also be several orders of magnitude greater than would be predicted if the energy savings were considered alone.
A: Most certainly not! Truly cost-effective energy efficiency improvements make great economic sense and improved energy efficiency may be a key determinant of future economic welfare. In this sense, it may also contribute indirectly to climate mitigation and decarbonization objectives (see "Discussion and Implications" section of our report).
As Skip Laitner of the American Council for an Energy Efficiency Economy writes, "our lagging efforts on efficiency may actually constrain our larger economic productivity."
As we note in our report, this is often the case, particularly in the developing world. Pursuing cost effective energy efficiency opportunities makes great sense then from an economic development and human welfare perspective. At the same time, however, this is precisely why energy efficiency can trigger significant rebound effects that reduce the ability of efficiency to drive down total greenhouse gas emissions, even as efficiency contributes significantly to greater economic growth.
In short, unlocking the full potential of efficiency may mean the difference between a richer, more efficient world, and a poorer, less efficient world. The former is clearly the desirable case, and the one we should all strive for! But in either case, the world will use more or less the same amount of energy. In some parts of the economy, efficiency may reduce overall energy use, while in others it may increase it. The net effect, after accounting for efficiency's role in unlocking economic growth (among other rebound effects) is far from a linear and direct reduction in energy use.
We therefore argue that we should continue to pursue any cost-effective efficiency opportunities on economic grounds, even as we reconsider the degree to which these measures will contribute to climate mitigation efforts.
"In any case, truly cost-effective energy efficiency measures should be vigorously pursued, as they will lead to an improvement in general welfare (at least narrowly construed in economic terms). However, from a climate mitigation perspective, we must be keenly aware of the precise, macroeconomic impacts of energy efficiency improvements, since only a reduction in total aggregate energy consumption will directly contribute to emissions reduction objectives. This in turn requires an understanding and analysis of the non-linear combination of impacts on economic activity, demand for energy as a factor of production, and other macroeconomic factors that are together summed up in the term 'rebound effect.'"
A: Rebound effects are part of the reason that energy use is still growing, even as the economy gets more and more efficient. True, economic growth drives up energy use, even as we get more efficient. But those two terms - economic growth, and energy efficiency - are not unrelated, and rebound effects describe the relationship between the two.
Part of the reason the economy continues to grow is because below-cost energy efficiency improvements grow the supply of energy services and increase the productivity of the economy - we get more economic activity and income and welfare out of the same amount of energy - and productivity improvements are a key driver of economic growth.
Some economists argue that the supply of energy services is a key enabling force in economic growth: think about the impact of electric motors, industrial lasers, computing, automation, and all of the other ways in which we use energy - often quite efficiently - to greatly improve the productivity of our economy. Think about how important energy services - lighting, efficient cooking stoves, electricity - are to development outcomes in the emerging economies of the world. Efficiently expanding the supply of energy services may thus be one of the principal factors determining the rate of economic growth in rich and poor nations alike (see the previous question for more).
That said, there are definitely other factors driving economic growth, including improvements in the productivity of other inputs to the economy, such as labor, capital, and other materials. Rebound effects and energy productivity improvements aren't the only driver of economy growth by any means.
A: Overall, the global economy has been growing at the rate of roughly 3% per year. Historically, we've only seen a roughly 1-1.5% improvement in energy use per unit of economic output (energy intensity or productivity) each year.
For energy efficiency gains to outstrip the increase in energy demand driven by the growing economy, the economy must improve energy intensity/productivity by at least 3% per year, roughly double or triple the historic rate of improvement.
So economic growth continues to out-pace energy efficiency improvements, and energy use continues to grow overall.
Efficiency advocates argue that if we work harder at capturing energy efficiency opportunities, we can more than double or triple this rate of efficiency improvement and bend global energy use downwards.
That's a big task already, but at least two factors make this challenge even harder:
First, a large portion of changes in energy intensity over time can be attributed to structural changes in the economy (Baksi and Green 2007), as economies shift from agricultural to industrial to services-oriented over time. These aren't the technical improvements in transportation, lighting, buildings, or industrial efficiency that energy efficiency policies are concerned with, and these trends are hard to accelerate or effect through policy. They may not continue indefinitely either, so there are limits to gains here.
If, for example, one-half or two-thirds of the historic rate in energy intensity improvements are due to sectoral transitions and structural changes in the economy, then efforts to increase the rate of technical efficiency improvement must work two or three times harder to succeed. Instead of a more than doubling or tripling of our efforts, we must achieve a more than four to nine-fold increase in technical efficiency improvements.
Second, that estimate does not account for rebound effects. Rebound makes the goal even more challenging, as it means efficiency feeds back into energy consumption and economic growth increasing both and making the horizon we're reaching towards recede even further. For every two steps forward we take with below-cost energy efficiency, rebound effects take us roughly one (or more) steps backwards.
For these reasons, we think it is prudent to revisit the ability of below-cost energy efficiency to decouple the economy from growing energy use and drive lasting reductions in climate-destabilizing greenhouse gases. While we should continue to pursue cost-effective energy efficiency measures improvements wherever they may be found, as we write in the report (p. 52):
"Efforts to reliably reduce greenhouse gas emissions or dependence on depleting fossil fuels would be prudent to avoid the risk of overreliance on energy efficiency measures. Such efforts should therefore focus primarily on shifting the means of energy production (rather than end use), relying on zero-carbon and renewable energy sources to diversify and decarbonize the global energy supply system."
A: While the term 'rebound effect' is generally used by energy economists to talk about rebounds after energy efficiency, the basic economic mechanisms - elasticity of demand and substitution, re-spending effects, and the contribution of productivity to economic growth - are well-understood economic phenomena relevant to improvements in the price or productivity of any factor of production, be it capital, materials, or labor.
Let's consider labor, for example. Economists would never assume that a 20% improvement in labor productivity - aka a "labor efficiency" improvement - would reduce overall demand for labor in the economy by 20%.
Everyone knows that improving labor productivity drives economic growth, creates new profitable ways to utilize labor, and overall generally increases employment at the macroeconomic scope, not decreases it.
Even at the scope of the individual factory or assembly line, improving labor productivity may mean the plant can get by with fewer laborers on the shop floor, but even there, the net effects on demand for labor are far from linear and direct. Higher labor productivity lowers product costs and increase demand for those products and opens up new markets that weren't profitable before. It frees up money to re-invest in other areas of production, and it creates new jobs in other areas of business. Even at the firm level, a 20% improvement in labor productivity won't mean 20% of the company's staff is laid off.
Yet this is precisely the simplified, linear assumption that is routinely made in energy and climate forecasting and scenario planning. A 20% improvement in energy efficiency = a direct, 20% net reduction in energy demand, relative to business as usual.
"Rebound effects" are what energy economists call the same, common sense story we just went over for labor, when we're talking about energy productivity or efficiency rather than labor productivity.
The reality is that energy isn't different from labor, or materials, or capital, and a whole field of academic work has gone on - largely out of notice of mainstream energy analysis and policy making - to explore and illustrate how energy efficiency leads to a series of complex, non-linear response throughout the economy that drive a rebound in demand for energy services and thus a rebound in consumption of energy itself. Our "Energy Emergence" report surveys this evidence and presents key implications for climate mitigation efforts.
A: More or less, yes. This basic but somewhat paradoxical dynamic - that energy efficiency lowers the price of energy services, leading to a rebound in consumption of those services - was first thoroughly discussed by British Economist William Stanley Jevons in an 1865 book, The Coal Question. He famously wrote, "It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth."
Some people define this so-called "Jevons Paradox" more strictly, saying that the Paradox refers only to cases when the rebound effects triggered by efficiency measures drives more demand for energy than was originally saved by the efficiency improvements. That's a scenario known in the rebound literature as "backfire," a special kind of severe rebound effect that is greater than 100% of the initially expected energy savings. Backfire means improving energy efficiency actually increases energy demand overall, relative to what it would have been if the efficiency measures hadn't been pursued at all. This is precisely what Jevons observed when he noted that the much more efficient steam engine developed by James Watt led to a huge increase in coal consumption during the 19th century, rather than the conservation of Britain's dwindling coal resources.
However, the generalized dynamic Jevons observed: that efficiency lowers the cost of energy services, driving a rebound in demand for those services, not a direct linear reduction in demand or conservation of fuels, is equivalent to what energy economists now call "rebound effects."
A: No, not all energy efficiency measures trigger rebound effects. Rebound effects are concerned with the response to below-cost efficiency improvements. That's the "low-hanging fruit" we always hear about, the efficiency measures that pay back more in avoided energy use than they cost to install. These are also the ones "below zero" on the often-cited McKinsey and Co. greenhouse gas abatement cost curve seen below. Below-cost efficiency measures always reduce the implicit price of energy services - the useful work provided by energy consumption, be it heating a home, transporting people or goods some distance, powering a production facility, or lighting a work space - and thus always trigger a rebound in demand for those services (see the first question in this series above). It's not a question of whether efficiency measures that truly "pay for themselves" will trigger rebound - they will - the question is how large that rebound will be?
Not all energy efficiency measures are below cost though (the graphic above has arrows pointing to a couple of 'above-cost' efficiency measures, according to McKinsey: plug-in hybrid electric cars, and efficient building design for new buildings). While they incur an economic cost, these efficiency measures should not trigger rebound effects and may still prove effective at reducing energy demand. As we wrote in the report (p. 52):
There is no shortage of opportunities to improve energy efficiency that are not cost-neutral or below-cost. While these measures come with a price tag, in many cases the costs are reasonable and such efforts may be well justified given the long-term threat, economic and otherwise, that global climate change represents.
A: Technically, yes. Price-induced efficiency improvements, whether in response to exogenous energy price increases (changes not caused by policy that is) or successful policy efforts to price carbon emissions or impose energy taxes, should not be expected to result in significant rebound. However, as we write in the report (p. 53), "to fully avoid rebound effects, energy price increases must be sufficient to keep the final price of energy services constant despite improvements in energy efficiency, eliminating any net productivity gains from the efficiency measures." That is, in rough terms, if energy efficiency drives down the price of energy services by 30% or 50%, then energy prices would have to increase through carbon taxes or fees by an equivalent 30% or 50%.
Achievement of deep reductions in energy demand and associated carbon emissions through price induced efficiency will therefore require substantial and rising energy prices over time and sustained over the multi-decadal periods relevant to climate policy, such that rising energy prices keep pace with the improvements in energy productivity.
Furthermore, if revenues collected through carbon pricing, energy taxes, or other efforts to raise energy prices are reinvested into economically productive ends, macroeconomic rebound effects may result, so the precise use of revenues will determine the efficacy of these policies in curbing rebound.
As we conclude in the report:
"Thus, carbon pricing policies (e.g., carbon taxes or cap and trade systems) and energy taxes offer potential tools to mitigate some or all of the energy demand rebound resulting from efficiency improvement - although implementing such policies faces practical challenges and will invariably encounter the political difficulties inherent to policy efforts that seek to impose energy price increases that will result in loss of economic welfare (ignoring potential benefits of avoided economic externalities).
A: Dr. Koomey has done no such thing, as he clarifies in a post at his own blog here. Koomey writes, "It will take time to review the technical questions in the detail this issue deserves, so I'll hold off on stating any conclusions until that work is done."
Joseph Romm of Climate Progress has misrepresented Koomey's work, claiming that "Some of the nation's top energy experts have debunked" our report, linking to a memo from Koomey as his sole evidence. There has been no "debunking" of the the Breakthrough Institute report surveying that literature nor even a serious attempt to debunk it.
A more up to date and unedited compilation of the key emails in that dialog can be read here, if the reader cares to delve deeply into this discussion and see for themselves. Note that the discussion is ongoing.
No. Far from blaming below-cost efficiency for "evils" we praise it as good for economic growth and welfare. However, we do point out that it can increase energy consumption, and that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions cannot rely, as many leading analysts to, on simplistic claims that energy efficiency results in direct energy consumption declines.
Steven Sorrell of the University of Sussex in England headed up a similarly comprehensive review of the evidence for rebound effects published by the UK Energy Research Center in 2007 and originally commissioned by the UK government. In reply to NRDC's David Goldstein and Ralph Cavanagh, he wrote:
"[T]he claim that the Breakthrough Institute "fails to back up its accusations with facts" is plain wrong. Their report is based upon a large volume of empirical evidence in the academic literature. I reviewed this a few years ago - [link] - and the Breakthrough report brings this up to date."
As Mr. Sorrell cautious, "[T]his topic [rebound effects] needs intelligent and careful research to help us understand it better, to improve the quantitative estimates, to reduce the uncertainties and to figure out what we can do in response. Simply dismissing it out of hand," as Goldstein and Cavanagh have tried to do, "will get us nowhere."
Do you have your own questions that aren't answered here? Please leave your question in the comments and we'll do our best to answer.
Last week Breakthrough co-founders Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus returned to Yale University for a retrospective on their seminal 2004 essay, "The Death of Environmentalism." In their speech they argued that the critical work of rethinking green politics was cut short by fantasies about green jobs and "An Inconvenient Truth." The latter backfired -- more Americans started to believe news of global warming was being exaggerated after the movie came out -- the former made false promises that could not be realized by cap and trade. What is an earnest green who cares about global warming to do now? In this speech, Nordhaus and Shellenberger reflect on what went so badly awry, and offer 12 Theses for a post-environmental approach to climate change.
It is a great pleasure to be here at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies for this retrospective on "The Death of Environmentalism." In early 2005 Yale invited us to debate that essay, and since then the School has continued to demonstrate a genuine interest in what our friend and colleague Peter Teague has taken to calling ecological innovation. You train your students to ask hard questions -- we saw this first hand in 2010 Breakthrough Fellow and Yale School Masters candidate David Mitchell -- and your flagship publication, Yale360, is publishing some of the most interesting green thinkers today. We are grateful once again for this opportunity to reflect on the nearly seven years since we wrote our essay, and make some new arguments about what the green movement must do now.
Seven years ago the two of us started interviewing America's environmental leaders with the intention of writing a report on the politics of global warming for the October 2004 meeting of the Environmental Grantmakers Association. We came away from the experience deeply disappointed. Not one of the environmental leaders we interviewed articulated a compelling vision or strategy for dealing with the challenge. None expressed much interest in rethinking their assumptions about the problem or the solutions. What we heard again and again during our interviews were the same old riffs that green leaders had been repeating since the late 1980's. Global warming would be solved through the same kinds of policies that we had used to address past pollution problems such as acid rain. Most were confident that John Kerry was, with their help, about to be elected president, and the biggest funders in the movement told us they were just a few steps away from passing cap and trade legislation.
That October we delivered our paper, "The Death of Environmentalism," at the Environmental Grantmakers Association conference. While leaders at environmental philanthropies and national green groups hoped that the debate the essay started would just go away, "The Death of Environmentalism" struck a cord with many others and sparked a spirited debate. Many took the paper's arguments personally and, without question, the most common reaction to our essay was "I'm not dead." Our friend Adam Werbach gave a speech called "Is Environmentalism Dead," wherein he suggested that environmentalists make common cause with a broader coalition of progressive interests in hopes of building a broader and more diverse movement. And Yale's own Gus Speth questioned whether capitalism itself was compatible with ecological sustainability and suggested a radical shift in values was required to deal with the problem.
Last week, a group of Senate Democrat leaders unveiled their plan to build off of the innovation-centered budget proposal released by the President two weeks ago, including several important investments in energy innovation, advanced manufacturing, and infrastructure.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced the proposal as an effort to simultaneously "create jobs, promote growth and help America win the future by making smart investments in education, innovation and infrastructure while cutting spending to live within our means."
The Senate Democrats' plan to judiciously invest in innovation and infrastructure while cutting wasteful spending elsewhere in the budget stands in sharp contrast to the Continuing Resolution bill passed by the House this weekend. The House bill budget would cut more than $60 billion from the federal budget to fund the government through FY2011, slashing several important energy innovation initiatives.
The House Republican's Continuing Resolution proposal to fund the government through the rest of Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11, ending Sept. 30) would slash energy innovation investments across federal agencies. The bill, H.R. 1, was introduced last Friday as the GOP's attempt to reduce the deficit and restore "fiscal responsibility," yet would nevertheless strip highly leveraged dollars from important federal programs, while representing merely a drop in the bucket of the $1.3 trillion federal deficit.
The Continuing Resolution as it stands would slice over two billion dollars from the DOE's budget alone and would have detrimental impacts on the state of American energy innovation. The budget cuts would force the layoffs of scientists and engineers, shrink the capabilities of laboratories and universities to perform the most critical cutting-edge energy research projects, and, by cutting funds for highly-leveraged loan guarantee programs, steer private sector funds away from American entrepreneurs and small businesses looking to demonstrate and deploy their innovative energy technologies on American soil.
The Continuing Resolution proposes cuts of at least 17% as compared to FY10 levels in each of the most innovation-oriented offices in the Department of Energy:
The agency which would be hardest hit would be the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), which funds both the riskiest and most transformative, early-stage energy innovation projects, and would lose a staggering 75% of its budget under H.R. 1.
The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), which was responsible for roughly 34% of the DOE's energy innovation investments in 2010, would lose 35% of its FY10 budget.
The Office of Science, which funds critical early-stage energy innovation research, would see a 20% decline in its budget. Office of Science devoted 20% of its 2010 budget to energy innovation funding, while supporting additional fundamental physical science research.
The Office of Nuclear Energy, which devoted 41% of its funds to energy innovation projects in 2010, would lose 23% of its budget.
Meanwhile, the Office of Fossil Energy would see an 11% reduction in its budget. 43% of the office's 2010 budget was devoted to energy innovation efforts.
Today's E&E News covered the release of the Breakthrough Institute's most recent report, "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena", pointing to the report's conclusion that "increasing the efficiency of our power systems and gadgets will not necessarily yield great reductions in energy use and could lead to using even more juice". The article is excerpted below (subscription required).
In a new review of energy efficiency literature, researchers at the Oakland, Calif.-based think tank found that a "rebound effect" means that implementing low-cost efficiency improvements can increase overall energy consumption and can even lead to a higher net energy use in what they describe as a "backfire effect."
"The implications are serious for climate and energy policy," wrote Michael Shellenberger, the institute's president, in a description of the study. "Energy efficiency measures that pay for themselves are good for the economy but are not guaranteed to reduce energy consumption or emissions, and may in fact increase them."
The study's conclusion is not that policymakers should steer clear of efficiency improvements, which the institute's researchers say are good for economic growth, but that such improvements should not be counted on to reduce energy use or associated emissions.
The study points to several mechanisms that contribute to the rebound effect. More efficient use of energy leads to higher production, with that increased economic output tied to higher energy use overall. Efficiency also leads to the substitution of energy inputs for others like labor and capital with a resulting increase in energy use.
Below-cost energy efficiency is critical for economic growth and should thus be aggressively pursued by governments and firms. However, it should no longer be considered a simple and direct way to reduce energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions.
Today Breakthrough Institute releases a new report finding extensive evidence that a large amount of the energy savings from below-cost energy efficiency are eroded by demand rebound, and that in some cases the rebound exceeds the savings, resulting in increased energy consumption from efficiency, known as backfire.
Leading government and international agencies, including the International Energy Agency, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate, and private consultancies such as McKinsey, have ignored or dismissed the strong evidence for rebound and even backfire in the peer-reviewed academic literature, resulting in climate mitigation scenarios that conclude that large emissions reductions can be achieved through greater efficiency. These agencies must, in future studies, take the evidence into account when constructing mitigation scenarios or risk a dangerous over-reliance on energy efficiency in climate mitigation strategies.
Below-cost energy efficiency is critical for economic growth and should thus be aggressively pursued by governments and firms. However, it should no longer be considered a simple and direct way to reduce energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions.
Rebound and backfire could be mitigated through raising the price of energy. However, given the tight relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, climate mitigation must focus on cutting the relationship between energy consumption and emissions, which means moving to low-cost, zero-carbon energy sources.
"Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" finds extensive evidence and a strong expert consensus that a large amount of the energy savings from below-cost energy efficiency are eroded by demand 'rebound effects,' and that in some cases the rebound exceeds the savings, resulting in increased energy consumption from efficiency, known as backfire. The report contains a comprehensive review of the expert literature.
There is a large expert consensus and strong evidence that below-cost energy efficiency measures drive a rebound in energy consumption that erodes much and in some cases all of the expected energy savings, concludes a new report by the Breakthrough Institute. "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" covers over 96 published journal articles and is one of the largest reviews of the peer-reviewed journal literature to date.
In a statement accompanying the report, Breakthrough Institute founders Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger wrote, "Below-cost energy efficiency is critical for economic growth and should thus be aggressively pursued by governments and firms. However, it should no longer be considered a direct and easy way to reduce energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions." The lead author of the new report is Jesse Jenkins, Breakthrough's Director of Energy and Climate Policy; Nordhaus and Shellenberger are co-authors.
The findings of the new report are significant because governments have in recent years relied heavily on energy efficiency measures as a means to cut greenhouse gases. "I think we have to have a strong push toward energy efficiency," said President Obama recently. "We know that's the low-hanging fruit, we can save as much as 30 percent of our current energy usage without changing our quality of life." While there is robust evidence for rebound in academic peer-reviewed journals, it has largely been ignored by major analyses, including the widely cited 2009 McKinsey and Co. study on the cost of reducing greenhouse gases.
President Obama released his fiscal year 2012 budget proposal this morning, a solid endorsement of the necessity to increase public investment in energy innovation amidst proposals to indiscriminately cut discretionary spending across all federal programs. The President's budget proposal builds off of the innovation-centered economic growth strategy presented in the State of the Union Address last month and the White House Innovation Report released two weeks ago.
On the energy investment front, the budget proposal aims to increase the DOE's budget by 11.8 percent over FY2010's current appropriation levels, or $3.1 billion dollars, a comparatively small increase in an overall budget proposal of $3.7 trillion that proposes reducing the projected deficit by roughly $110 billion per year for the next ten years.
This budget increase is a vital step towards meeting the scale of the energy innovation challenge long-underlined by the Breakthrough Institute and by a general consensus of leading energy innovation experts, think tanks, and policymakers.
However, not all of these increases lie with funding for energy innovation. Using the Energy Innovation Tracker, a tool that compiles federal energy-innovation funding across nine federal agencies for the years 2009-2011, inclusive of ARRA, we've broken out investments in energy innovation (defined in the tracker as Basic Science, RD&D, and Education investments) from general energy investments in measures such as deployment, facility construction, and program management.
On Monday, I appeared on an hour-long webinar hosted by theEnergyCollective.com on China and Energy, diving into questions of energy innovation, competitiveness, and the challenge of meeting China's soaring demand.
Carolyn Bartholomew, a commissioner on the US-China Economic Security and Review Commission joined myself and moderator Marc Gunther to dive into the issues at stake.
We discussed how China can be both the world leader in clean and dirty energy, simultaneously leading the world in the production of clean energy technologies and global contributions to climate-destabilizing carbon dioxide and coal consumption; the economic stakes of the global clean energy race and China's rising prowess in clean tech innovation and production; and the huge scale of energy demand in the rapidly developing nation.
Listen to the audio - "China and Energy" webinar, 1/31/11: (length 01:01:10)
Last week, President Obama threw down an ambitious national goal in his second State of the Union Address: by 2035, 80% of America's electricity will come from "clean" energy sources, double the share we now derive from clean sources.
But what counts as "clean," how do we get there, and is the goal feasible?
Dr Nathan Lewis, a distinguished professor of chemistry at CalTech and direct of the new, Department of Energy-funded Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hub (which also got a shout-out in the President's SOTU) appeared on NPR/WBUR's "On Point" radio yesterday, to discuss the President's clean energy objectives, the energy innovation challenges that must be overcome to reach that goal, and the economic and environmental consequences at stake.
I highly recommend you give the segment a listen here.
With last night's State of the Union address, President Obama has shifted the debate from the partisan climate wars to an expansive energy innovation policy which has the potential to draw support from across the political spectrum.
With last night's State of the Union address, President Obama has shifted the debate from the partisan climate wars to an expansive energy innovation policy which has the potential to draw support from across the political spectrum.
"In embracing breakthrough innovation for solar and nuclear power alike -- for economic competitiveness rather than climate reasons -- President Obama took a bold first step toward a national commitment to energy innovation that is in the long tradition of bi-partisan support for science and technology," wrote Breakthrough Institute co-founders Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus in a statement. "While the road forward will not be easy, at least it is one America has traveled before."
In a State of the Union speech framed centrally around restoring America's global economic leadership, President Obama argued forcefully for increasing federal investment in energy innovation, declaring that "breakthrough" technologies have driven decades of innovation that "created new industries and millions of new jobs."
Obama's speech was a rejection of proposals to cut federal spending across the board, as he finally made the case before the American people about why public support for innovation is critical for the country's long-term prosperity:
David Owen's recent New Yorker article on energy efficiency and rebound phenomena has sparked a lively debate in a number of blog posts but it has also resulted in some confusion. The purpose of this post is to lend clarity to the rebound debate by dispelling some misconceptions about rebound.
Rebound comes from several sources, requiring important distinctions. Typically, rebound analysts distinguish consumer-side effects from producer-side effects. A second distinction frequently called upon is between so-called direct and indirect rebound. On top of these rebound classifications, some analysts identify a so-called macroeconomic effect.
As Ryan Avent writes: "economics is clearly moving beyond the carbon-tax-alone position on climate change, which is a good thing. If the world is to reduce emissions, it needs technologies that are both green and cheap enough to be attractive to economically-stressed countries and people. And a carbon tax alone may not generate the necessary innovation."
Over at the Economist, Ryan Avent notes that economists are beginning to move beyond a simple reliance on carbon pricing as the sine qua non of climate policy:
The typical baseline economist response to the problem of global warming is a very simple and straightforward one. Climate change is a negative externality, and the carbon emissions that generate it are easily targetable. The clear thing to do, then, is to place a tax on carbon emissions which will lead economic actors to internalise the cost of the warming they create with their decisions. This will discourage carbon-intensive activities and contribute to the development of clean alternative, reducing emissions and climate change.
Easy enough. Unfortunately, this strategy quickly runs into difficulty. One big problem is political. It's very difficult to convince people to accept higher energy costs, and it's very difficult to coordinate policy across countries, which is necessary to ensure that the policy works correctly. But there are also economic challenges. ... Economies are good at finding substitutes for key technologies, but it does take some time. And so because the world has waited so long to act, it now seems that the disaster-avoiding carbon tax path may itself be too economically damaging. So what's an economist to advocate?
Here's an intriguing story to kick off the new year with a little retrospection...
Flash back to 2008, and nearly all of the top GOP contenders for a 2012 presidential run were taking global warming pretty seriously and offering real, if measured, endorsements of Congressional or state action to curb pollution and GHGs.
On the campaign stump, in books, speeches and nationally-televised commercials, aspiring GOP White House candidates such as Tim Pawlenty, Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney have warned in recent years about the threats from climate change and pledged to limit greenhouse gases. Some have even committed the ultimate sin, endorsing the controversial cap-and-trade concept that was eventually branded "cap and tax."
Back in 2008, Newt Gingrich took to a couch next to the Right's current-day arch-nemesis, Nancy Pelosi, to endorse Congressional climate action in an ad sponsored by Al Gore's Alliance for Climate Protection.
And as Politico notes, even Sarah Palin has flip flopped on the issue:
Just days after McCain picked her as his running mate, Palin told ABC News she believes human activities "certainly can be contributing to the issue of global warming, climate change" and that "we've got to do something about it, and we have to make sure that we're doing all we can to cut down on pollution."
Politico's Darren Samuelsohn calls it the McCain effect, with John McCain's prominent endorsement of cap and trade legislation making it safe for GOPers to talk about climate.
"I think McCain is moving in a responsible direction," then-House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) told E&E News in May 2008. "Clearly the issue of climate change is on the minds of a lot of people. Humans clearly contribute to this. It just really depends on what kind of a cap-and-trade system, what kind of safety valves are in there."
Flash forward just a few years and each of these prominent GOPers are likely running for an excuse, a mea culpa, or another way to distance themselves from green records that are now liabilities with a Republican base strongly influenced by the Tea Party movement.
So what happened? Was it simply the polarizing direction of the cap and trade debate? The shift in the economic winds? The rise of the Tea Party? The inherent politics of a proposal centered on making our current base of energy sources more expensive, rather than making the cleaner alternatives cheaper?
Whatever the constellation of causes, the change is quite stark. Looking ahead to 2011 and beyond, can we build a new and enduring consensus around an innovation-centered approach to energy reform, building a clean economy, and responsibly reducing pollution? And can we make it sustained enough to avoid the factors that turned the endorsements of prominent GOP leaders into liabilities just a few years later?
Nobel Laureate physicist Dr. Burton Richter discusses the three dimensions of the global energy challenge - economy, security, and environment - in his keynote at the "Energy Innovation 2010" conference in December.
"Energy Innovation 2010" keynote presentation delivered by Nobel laureate physicist Dr. Burton Richter on December 15, 2010.
(Richter's Keynote begins at 5:56 in the video below)
I have been asked by the organizers to be provocative at this discussion of energy innovation - the more provocative the better, I was told. So far, the talks have focused on the need for innovation to get the technologies of the future developed and deployed so that the issue of climate change can be effectively addressed. We all know that the country is not getting the action on the Federal front that the issue warrants, and thinking about how we might do better leads me to three questions.
1. Have we focused so exclusively on climate change as a justification for action on energy that we have excluded potential allies?
2. Have we emphasized ultra-green technologies that are not yet ready for the big time, and so had our desire for the perfect drive out the available good?
3. Have we pushed policies that are so narrowly targeted as to prevent much larger and less costly emissions reductions to be made in the nearer term than have been made with the renewables?
On December 15th 2010, hundreds of leading thinkers, scientists, public officials, and innovators gathered in Washington, DC for the Energy Innovation 2010 Conference to initiate a new conversation on a new energy policy paradigm for the 21st century
For 35 years, government and the market have been trying and failing to get energy policy right. Congress has failed to pass large-scale clean energy and climate legislation, while China and other competitors are moving aggressively to take the lead in new energy technology. And the market has failed to create needed low-carbon technology on its own. Meanwhile, the nation's dependence on oil and coal deepens and global temperatures continue to rise. To address these issues, we need to get past the old energy policy paradigm - and we just may be turning the corner.
On December 15th 2010, hundreds of leading thinkers, scientists, public officials, and innovators gathered in Washington, DC for the Energy Innovation 2010 Conference to initiate a new conversation on a new energy policy paradigm: one that recognizes the central role of innovation in resolving the world's looming energy challenges and boosting American competitiveness. Climate change aside, we can't rely on carbon-based fuels for the next 150 years the way we did for the last 150. And we can't create the transformational energy innovations we need without putting innovation front and center.
"Energy Innovation 2010" merely begins a new national energy dialog that must continue well into the coming years. Breakthrough Institute and our partners will continue to spearhead this conversation as we seek new strategies to address the multifaceted energy challenges facing America and the world.
In case you missed the conference, held before a packed house at the National Press Club, or if you simply want to revisit the top notch presentations delivered throughout the packed day, videos from the full conference can be viewed below.
Earlier this month, China surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy and since, has snared a flurry of clean tech headlines that collectively tell a very clear story: China is rapidly and effectively securing its position as a global clean technology leader as the U.S. watches in stagnated wonder.
Below we've aggregated some of the most important updates coming out of China over recent weeks as it surges to the front of the global clean technology sector:
Starting in the 1970s green groups helped kill new nuclear plants by claiming greater energy efficiency would slash energy consumption. It didn't. Energy demand rose 40 percent more than Amory Lovins predicted. The result? A coal-plant building boom. Time to rethink the role of energy efficiency.
By Michael Shellenberger, Ted Nordhaus, and Jesse Jenkins
If there's one thing everyone knows for certain, it's that energy efficiency reduces energy consumption. President Obama, Steven Chu, Fortune 500 chieftains, Silicon Valley VCs, the U.N. and McKinsey all say it.
Why, then, does ever-greater efficiency go hand-in-hand with ever-greater energy consumption? In this week's New Yorker, journalist David Owen explains this apparent paradox. The essay (excerpted below) is as fascinating as anything written by Malcolm Gladwell. And the implications for energy and climate policy are of great significance.
From hybrid crops to blockbuster drugs, nuclear power to wind power, and microchips to the Internet, government support was critical to the productive public-private partnerships that spawned so many revolutionary American technologies.
This presentation was delivered by Jesse Jenkins (Director of Energy and Climate Policy, Breakthrough Institute) and Daniel Sarewitz (Director, Center for Science, Policy, and Outcomes, ASU; Breakthrough Institute Senior Fellow) at the Energy Innovation 2010 Conference, December 15th, 2010.
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Apple, Amgen and General Electric. Bill Gates, Thomas Edison, and Alexander Graham Bell.
We are all familiar with these genius inventors and titans of industry.
Yet most of us remain unaware of the almost constant presence of a silent partner in American innovation: the federal government.
We might recall something about microchips and the space race, or know that the National Institutes of Health funds research into new drugs and treatments.
But most of us remain unaware of the depth and breadth of government support for technology innovation.
As we gather today to consider how to drive forward the dramatic innovation needed to deliver cheap, clean and massively scalable energy sources to power world, we would do well to pause and take a look back at the United State's long history of limited but energetic public investment in breakthrough technologies.
Where do good technologies come from? The history of American innovation shows that an active partnership between the public and private sectors has been key to developing breakthrough technologies, which have driven generations of economic prosperity. In an updated report, the Breakthrough Institute explores this partnership through a set of case studies in American innovation.
Driving directions from your iPhone. The cancer treatments that save countless lives. The seed hybrids that have slashed global hunger. A Skype conversation while flying on a Virgin Airlines jet across the continent in just five hours.
Where did these everyday miracles come from?
As soon as the question is asked we know to suspect that the answer is not as simple as Apple, Amgen, or General Electric. We might recall something about microchips and the Space Race, or know that the National Institutes of Health funds research into new drugs and treatments.
But most of us remain unaware of the depth and breadth of American government support for technology and innovation. Our gratitude at being able to video chat with our children from halfway around the world (if we feel gratitude at all) is directed at Apple, not the Defense Department. When our mother's Neupogen works to fight her cancer, we thank Amgen, not NIH or NSF.
By Rob Atkinson, Ted Nordhaus, and Michael Shellenberger
For forty years, presidents and policymakers have promised and planned for a new energy future just over the horizon. While the rationales have varied - reducing dependence on imported oil, stopping global warming, reducing air pollution, creating clean energy jobs - the song has largely remained the same: America has most, if not all, of the technologies needed today to make a quick and relatively painless transition away from fossil fuels.
Yet America is more dependent upon fossil fuels than ever before. U.S. oil consumption rose from 15 to 20 million barrels a day between 1970 and today, while coal still provides about 50 percent of our electricity. U.S. carbon emissions continue to rise unabated, as efforts to cap them have repeatedly foundered in the face of daunting political, economic, and technological obstacles. And renewable technologies like wind and solar only meet a tiny fraction of America's energy needs despite several decades of efforts to subsidize their deployment.
When experts convene in Washington next week to discuss energy policy at the Energy Innovation 2010 conference, they will do so in the wake of yet another failed federal effort to pass legislation to support a transition away from fossil fuel-based energy.
Breakthrough Institute and other leading think tanks sponsor day-long conference rethinking energy innovation in the United States: getting to scale, making clean energy cheap, securing American leadership.
After
two years of often-tumultuous debate in Congress, the national debate
over energy and climate change policy has now been altered: cap and
trade policy efforts have run aground in Congress, perhaps fatally, and
Republicans are ascendant, reshaping the national political landscape.
Meanwhile, with economic recovery the top priority for the public and
policymakers alike, America's clean tech competitors are surging ahead,
raising the stakes for energy policy.
Against this backdrop,
support is growing on both right and left for new national investments
in energy innovation that can help address some of the most urgent
imperatives of our time - renewing the economy, improving energy
security and public health, and overcoming key environmental challenges.
A growing chorus of voices thus counsels a renewed national commitment to develop breakthrough energy technologies - and to the reform of America's energy innovation system itself.
In
recent months, energy experts have advised policymakers to: take a page
from the nation's long history of successful military research and
procurement; build on the success of agricultural research stations and
the National Institutes of Health by establishing new innovation
institutes and clusters nationwide; promote the right mix of both
competition and collaboration to spur innovation and productive
knowledge spillover; reform energy subsidies to reward innovation; and
restructure business taxes to promote investment in the building blocks
of an innovation economy.
On December 15th, a group of America's leading policy think tanks will host a day-long conference in Washington D.C. to rethink energy innovation.
Energy Innovation 2010,
held at the National Press Club, will bring together leading experts
from government, think tanks, academia, and business to ask hard
questions about how energy innovation efforts can be brought to scale,
how the innovation system must be restructured and reformed, and how to
renew the kind of active partnerships between the public and private
sectors that were responsible for so much of America's prior
technological innovation and economic strength.
Breakthrough Institute is proud to organize and sponsor this free, day-long conference, along with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and with sponsoring partners the American Enterprise Institute, Third Way, Clean Air Task
Force, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Securing
America's Future Energy, and the Brookings Institution. We are pleased to
welcome TheEnergyCollective.com and Yale Environment 360 as media sponsors for the event.
Forcing countries to agree to emissions caps will never work, argue Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger. The duo argues in a special Wall Street Journal column that the global community should think past U.N. climate talks in Cancun and focus instead on energy innovation, adaptation, and no regrets policies that do not require agreement about global warming.
The failure of the U.N. climate process is proof that shared economic sacrifice cannot be the basis of global action. Nations will not scale up clean energy as long as it remains so much more expensive than fossil fuels. Thinking past talks in Cancun, nations should focus instead on energy innovation, adaptation, and no regrets policies that do not require agreement about global warming. The first step is recognizing that the global market for clean energy exists only thanks to government subsidies and mandates. Instead of imposing emissions controls and subsidizing existing technologies, nations should use competitive deployment to purchase advanced energy technologies, benchmark the winners, and allow intellectual property to spill-over between firms and nations.
This is the framework we propose for pragmatic global climate action in the cover story for a special energy section in today's Wall Street Journal, pegged to the start of U.N. climate talks in Cancun, Mexico. Today also marks the launch of a new web site, Breakthrough Europe, and its kick-off post, "Cancun Can't: The Twilight of European Climate Leadership," which documents the failure of Europe's cap and trade system to reduce emissions.
Our Wall St. Journal essay, "How to Change the Global Energy Conversation," builds on Breakthrough Institute's thinking about the failure of the UN process ("Scrap Kyoto," Democracy Journal), the clean tech intellectual property illusion ("The Revolution Will Not Be Patented," Slate), the green Keynesianism and neoliberalism behind Obama's green jobs fiasco ("Green Jobs for Janitors," The New Republic), and our proposal to make clean energy cheap through technology innovation ("Fast, Clean & Cheap," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Feb 2008).
Gains from a stronger proposed EU emissions target will be swamped by two weeks of emissions growth in China, according to the International Energy Agency.
Were the European Union to call for a deeper cut in carbon dioxide emissions, it would do little to stem the unrelenting increase in global emissions and is unlikely to have any effect on the international climate negotiations, according to the International Energy Agency.
While Europe's negotiating position in international climate talks remains a target of 20 percent emissions reductions below 1990 levels by 2020, some have pushed it to target an additional ten percent reduction. The EU has long maintained that it would boost its target to 30 percent if other industrialized countries followed suit.
"We estimate extending Europe's plan to cut emissions from 20 to 30 percent would roughly equal China's two-week gas output."
Could the 10 percent EU additional emissions cut really equal only two weeks of emissions in China? We checked the numbers on that (h/t Roger Pielke, Jr.), and Mr. Birol is indeed correct.
Research and innovation on energy storage and transmission technology must proceed in parallel as the nation ramps up use of renewable energy, according to a new report from the American Physical Society.
New innovations in energy storage, transmission, and the integration of variable electricity sources are necessary to enable renewable energy sources to contribute significantly to the U.S. energy supply, according to a new report from the American Physical Society.
Establishing national policies to spur the deployment and adoption of renewable electricity sources, such as wind and solar power, are important, but the scientists warn that research and innovation must also proceed in parallel on better energy storage technologies, new strategies for integrating the varying and intermittent output of these energy sources, and improved technologies for the long-distance transmission of renewable electricity.
A new report by Third Way and an op-ed by three U.S. Senators add to the gathering consensus for a technology and innovation-led strategy for clean energy progress and economic renewal.
America can recapture the lead in the global clean energy race if it commits itself to a major public-private effort to spur clean energy innovation.
That's the message of a new report released today by Democratic think tank Third Way. The report, "Creating a Clean Energy Century," is the first in a series of reports from Third Way's new project on energy innovation, co-chaired by U.S. Senators Mark Udall (D-CO), Kay Hagan (D-N.C.), and Debbie Stabenow (D-MI).
The report begins with clear-cut premises. Clean energy is still too expensive and unreliable relative to fossil fuels. Other countries are moving toward clean energy more quickly than the United States. Countries that are able to make clean energy cheaper than fossil fuels will gain the greatest economic benefits, by capturing more of the rapidly growing domestic and global markets for clean energy.
There will be no cap-and-trade climate bill considered in the next Congress, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) promised a colleague today.
Newly sworn-in Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) said today that Reid made a "total commitment" to him that there would be no cap and trade next session.
Reid's office confirmed the promise. "Given the election results, there is no chance we can deal with cap and trade," Reid spokesman Jim Manley told E&ENews PM.
New ideas will clearly be needed to make clean energy progress in the next Congress and beyond.
For more on that, see the "Climate Next" series now underway at the Atlantic, Slate, Mother Jones and the other participating partners in the Climate Desk project. Breakthrough's Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus kick off the series with their essay, "Innovate First, Regulate Later."
Remaining competitive in the fast-growing, 21st century clean energy sectors will demand the same world-class talent and highly-trained workforce that helped the United States lead the world in the high-tech sectors of the 20th century.
Today, the race for dominance in clean energy technology sectors pits the United States against the greatest international competition for a key emerging technology field than in any era since the Cold War race to lead in aerospace, computing, communications, and IT fields.
Remaining competitive in the fast-growing, 21st century clean energy sectors will demand the same world-class talent and highly-trained workforce that helped the United States lead the world in the high-tech sectors of the 20th century.
As we wrote in "Post-Partisan Power," a road map for a limited and direct national energy innovation strategy recently released by Breakthrough Institute and scholars at the Brookings Institution and American Enterprise Institute:
The United States cannot hope to rise to this global challenge or confront pressing energy innovation imperatives without a new national investment to train and inspire the next generation of intrepid American scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs. Today, the United States ranks just 29th out of 109 countries in the percentage of 24-year-olds with a math or science degree.47 Only 15 percent of undergraduate degrees in the United States are earned in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields compared with 64 percent in Japan and 52 percent in China. Even South Korea -- a nation with a population one-sixth the size of the United States -- graduates more engineers annually.
The situation is particularly dire in energy technology, with roughly half of the U.S. energy industry workforce expected to retire over the next decade. Meanwhile, demand for workers in the renewable electricity industry is expected to more than triple from 127,000 in 2006 to more than 400,000 in 2018. The anticipated, large-scale ramp-up of the U.S. nuclear power industry would similarly require the industry to hire tens of thousands of new nuclear engineers and related positions annually. Yet today, from elementary school through post-doctorate programs, students and educators lack the resources to develop new curricula and educational programs, receive key training, or expand research opportunities to meet this national challenge.
Over at theEnergyCollective.com, Tyler Hamilton dives into the International Energy Agency's newly released forecast of global energy trends (exec sum here [pdf]) focusing on the disparity in global subsidies for renewables and fossil fuels:
The International Energy Agency put out its annual World Energy Outlook today and urges strong and sustained government support for the deployment of renewable energy. The agency pegs 2009 subsidies for renewables at $57 billion and calls for that to increase to $205 billion by 2035. "The share of modern renewable energy sources, including sustainable hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, modern biomass and marine energy, in global primary energy use triples between 2008 and 2035 and their combined share of total primary energy demand increases from 7 per cent to 14 per cent," according to the agency. Fossil fuel subsidies stood at $312 billion in 2009 and the agency urged that they be eliminated to accelerate the transition to renewables.
I applaud the IEA's call for major public investments in clean energy RD&D and deployment and certainly support the agency's calls to phase out fossil fuel subsidies -- excepting where doing so would expand the already deplorable share of the global population (about 2.4 billion) locked in energy poverty.
But while Hamilton and others focus on the disparity between total subsidies for fossil energy and renewables, the IEA figures are actually a stark reminder of the major price gap that persists between mature fossil energy sources and newer, costlier clean energy alternatives.
In a recent interview with NPR's Robert Siegel, Breakthrough Senior Fellow Roger Pielke Jr. discusses why cap and trade policy collapsed under the weight of its political and practical limitations. He proposes a new path forward focused on making clean energy cheap, instead of continually trying to make fossils fuels more expensive.
Below is an excerpt from the interview transcript. Click here to listen to the full interview and read the entire transcript:
The United States and Australia have inked a new partnership to pursue joint solar energy research designed to make solar energy cheap enough to compete with fossil fuels.
Prime Minister Julia Gillard and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the announcement in Melbourne on Sunday, with the Australian government set to commit up to $50 million towards the program.
Ms Gillard said the aim was to make solar power as cheap as conventional energy sources.
"One of the greatest barriers to a broader commercial take up of solar power is its cost and that is specifically what this joint research initiative will address," Ms Gillard told reporters.
"The joint project with the United States is part of an aggressive effort to bring the sales price of solar technology down by two to four times."
Ms Clinton said the program aimed to make solar power competitive with conventional energy sources by 2015.
The price had dropped by 50 per cent in the past three years but there was more work to be done, she said.
"Under this initiative our two governments will share both the costs and the benefits of research and development which will speed up innovation," she said.
Secretary Clinton also pledged a $500,000 grant from the U.S. State Department to support a global survey to identify opportunities to reuse carbon dioxide emitted by power plant and industrial processes, headed up by the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute, a recently established research center co-funded by the Australian government.
Solar Powerhouse? Solar irradiation in Australia is among the highest in the world, as this color-coded map from NASA illustrates (darker red areas have the most incoming solar energy). Source: The Age/Reuters
Australia, with perhaps the greatest solar energy potential in the world, has an obvious interest in pursuing affordable, scalable solar power solutions, and has also maintained several long-standing solar research efforts. Can the two new partners accelerate efforts to make solar energy cheap?
In an effort to develop a truly effective post-cap and trade climate strategy, policy is not the only aspect that requires deep reflection - philanthropists, too, must reconsider the best way to channel grants in order to successfully fund solutions to climate and energy challenges. Breakthrough's Director of Climate and Energy Policy Jesse Jenkins recently spoke to a foundation about re-thinking philanthropic efforts in a post-cap and trade policy environment, offering insight into how policy makers, activists, and philanthropists, alike, must re-orient away from the focus on limits and toward an approach that harnesses human ingenuity to directly confront the scale of the global climate and energy challenge.
Despite rising national debts, would national governments be wise to borrow today to fund investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and innovation to be enjoyed by -- and paid back by -- a richer, more well-off generation tomorrow?
Here's an interesting argument from our friends across the pond at the UK-focused Political Climate blog, making the case that despite rising deficit concerns and austerity measures in the UK and elsewhere, borrowing from the future may still actually be an appropriate way to pay for clean energy innovation today:
Against this background, it may sound mad to argue for more public borrowing in order to pay for investments in low carbon technologies and infrastructure, but that is what I am going to do in this post.
Let's start with the rationale. ... The starting point is that in advanced economies successive generations tend to get better off over time. For example, at the depths of the 1930s depression Keynes observed that despite the general gloom, he was confident that 100 years in the future, people might be eight times better off in real terms. And indeed average GDP per capita in the UK is now already about 5 times what it was in the 1930s. By extension, we would normally expect future generations to be better off than us in GDP terms.
... [Furthermore, if] we in this generation mitigate climate change, we will allow future generations to have a higher standard of living than they would have if we did nothing. We are very slowly beginning to do this, with policies being introduced to encourage us to invest less in conventional capital (e.g. fossil fuel power stations) and more in investments that effectively maintain natural capital (like renewable energy).
At the moment we are paying for these more expensive investments through reduced consumption, in the form of higher energy bills. If instead we were to borrow a certain amount of money from future generations (who will have to repay through their taxes) and use this money to pay the extra cost of renewables, carbon capture and storage and so on, then the theory says it should be possible to make both our generation and future generations better off. ...
With the GOP set to make significant electoral gains on November 2nd, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham is urging the GOP to work together with Democrats and President Obama in the coming Congress to make bipartisan progress on the nation's energy challenges. But the South Carolina Republican pointedly rejected further work on a cap-and-trade proposal he briefly backed during the 110th Congress.
According to E&E news (subscription required) Graham recently told South Carolina's WVOC radio last night:
"My belief is, if we get back in power in the House and get close in the Senate, that we ought to really clamp down on spending and reform the government. ... But we ought to not put ourselves in the position of being the party that said 'no' to hard problems, that we ought to ... come up with an energy policy without cap and trade that will create energy jobs in America, break our dependency on foreign oil and clean up the air. ... There's plenty of things that we could do that would be good for job creation by challenging the president to come to the middle and find ways to move forward as a nation, and put the burden on him to say 'no' to us."
Graham added:
"Energy legislation in the Senate has stalled, and our energy policy in America is nonexistent. The EPA's going to start regulating carbon in January if the Congress doesn't act. So one of the real priorities of the Congress and the nation ought to be energy independence."
Support for a technology-first approach to America's energy and climate needs is rapidly growing in the wake of the October 14 release of the "Post-Partisan Power" proposal by scholars at the Brookings Institution, AEI and Breakthrough Institute. Here is a sampling of the many reactions and widespread discussion generated by the report...
Joshua Green, Atlantic Monthly & Boston Globe: "Unlike most of what gets introduced just before an election, this was not a soon-to-be-forgotten political ploy, but a long-term project to accomplish what Congress and the president could not: put the country on the path to a clean energy future."
David Leonhardt, New York Times: [T]he death of cap and trade doesn't have to mean the death of climate policy. The alternative revolves around much more, and much better organized, financing for clean energy research. It's an idea with a growing list of supporters, a list that even includes conservatives -- most of whom opposed cap and trade."
Tim Mak, Frum Forum (a site started by former Bush speechwriter David Frum): "If Americans want to fight the challenges of climate change and reduce their dependence on foreign oil, this piece sets a good baseline for discussion."
Ezra Klein, Washington Post: "It's not that PPP is a sure thing, nor that it will pass Congress anytime soon. The Tea Party Republicans will need to sow their wild and crazy oats for awhile before they feel any need to tack to the center. But when they do, they aren't going to embrace cap and trade. They might, on the other hand, embrace a limited and direct approach to energy innovation."
Michael Levi, Council on Foreign Relations: [T]his idea may well make a lot of sense... most of the paper is actually a smart and thoughtful discussion of how to do energy innovation policy right".
Kirsten Powers, New York Post: " If America wants to remain the leader of the world economy, Washington has to attack this issue."
Bryan Walsh, TIME Magazine: "A truly bipartisan approach on energy and climate won't be easy--sometimes, especially right before an election, it seems completely impossible--but it's the only approach we can hope for, if we still hope."
Nature: "[G]iven the lack of consensus in other areas, long-term R&D intended to bring the cost of clean energy down might well be one area where lawmakers will be able to agree."
Case Western professor Jonathan Adler writes: "While not without flaws, the proposal represents a serious alternative to politically-moribund cap-and-trade proposals and the regulate-everything mindset that produced the Waxman-Markey bill."
Newsweek: "Cap-and-trade is on life support, but its weakness is giving other ideas room to breathe. Emerging proposals focus on investment in clean energy, pitched to the public with a narrative that omits a doomsday point of view about global warming and instead focuses on more practical considerations like job creation or the need to stop certain types of pollution."
All that convergence around a politically centrist, technology-first approach alarmed some climate warriors on left and right.
Climate skeptic Steven Milloy of Green Hell blog (and Junkscience.com) wrote: "The left isn't oscillating at all. They are focused on establishing a one-world socialist paradise. Whatever path gets the comrades there, they'll follow. Global warming has just been there most successful gambit to date."
Said Grist.org's David Roberts: "The Republican Party don't want to spend government money on clean energy, Hayward notwithstanding."
Joe Romm, ClimateProgress.org: [It] should also be obvious we're not going to get a massive federal clean energy program either."
Not all long-time climate warriors were sour on the proposal.
While EDF chief economist Nathaniel Keohane reiterates that "we need both cap and trade and sustained investment in clean energy R&D," he went on to tell the New York Times' David Leonhardt, "if it turns out that we can't get cap and trade in the near term, we need R&D investment all the more."
Harvard's Robert Stavins still insists "there is no other feasible approach that can provide meaningful emissions reductions" beyond cap and trade, but he acknowledges: "New path-breaking technologies will be needed to address climate change, and public support for private-sector or public-sector R&D will be crucial to meet this need."
MIT's Michael Greenstone, a long-time cap and trade supporter, isn't so sure about the real-world viability of the policy he once advocated. "The first best hope was getting a world price for carbon, and that now looks remote in the coming years," he told Leonhardt. "But there are ways in which the other options may be preferable to a price only in the U.S." Greenstone endorses the need for $25 billion in clean energy R&D investments and rightly explains, "All the action is really going to be occurring in developing countries" who will need clean and affordable energy to power their economic growth.
In a second post, Washington Post's Ezra Klein looks the realpolitik in the face as well and concludes: "The best of all worlds would've been a price on carbon married to a big investment in clean-energy research. But this is not the best of all worlds. This is our world. And this [technology-first proposal] ... might be our last, best chance to protect it."
Update The Washington Post editorial page endorses Post-Partisan Power's call for a bipartisan energy innovation strategy, noting: "Even if cap-and-trade had passed, the logic goes, the government would still have had to invest in scientific research to make green energy affordable; might as well make those investments, anyway ... incremental action is better than none."
David Ropeik brings to light a pragmatic point about the psychological challenges to new nuclear power deployment caused by fear of nuclear power:
But, as is often the case with risk perception, emotional filters, more than the facts, determine how afraid we are, or aren't.
Whether this is rational or irrational, right or wrong, is irrelevant. It is, inescapably, how it is. But we must recognize that our response to risk can pose a danger all by itself. Our fear of nuclear power has led to energy economics that favor coal and oil for electricity, at great cost to human and environmental health. Particulate pollution from fossil fuels kills tens of thousands of Europeans every year, and CO2 emissions fuel a potentially calamitous shift in global climate.
No amount of education or good communication can get around this. Subjective risk perception is hard-wired into our architecture and chemistry. What governments can do is to learn what psychological research has established: our perceptions, as real as they are and as much as they must be respected in a democracy, can create their own perils.
With that understanding, government risk assessment can account not only for the facts, but also for how we feel about them and how we behave. That way, we can reduce conflict over nuclear power and other risk issues, and foster wiser and more productive policies for public and environmental health.
When policies on emissions reductions collide with policies focused on economic growth, economic growth will win out every time. Climate policies should flow with the current of public opinion rather than against it, and efforts to sell the public on policies that will create short-term economic discomfort cannot succeed if that discomfort is perceived to be too great. Calls for asceticism and sacrifice are a nonstarter.
The "iron law" thus presents a boundary condition on policy design that is every bit as limiting as is the second law of thermodynamics, and it holds everywhere around the world, in rich and poor countries alike. It says that even if people are willing to bear some costs to reduce emissions (and experience shows that they are), they are willing to go only so far...
To succeed, any policies focused on decarbonizing economies will necessarily have to offer short-term benefits that are in some manner proportional to the short-term costs. In practice, this means that efforts to make dirty energy appreciably more expensive will face limited success.
...
The unavoidable reality is that policy makers and those they represent are committed to sustaining economic growth, bringing populations out of poverty, and expanding access to energy. Emissions reduction goals will not be achieved by policies that seek to stimulate innovation by constricting, much less by reducing, economic activity.
Yesterday, scholars from the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the Breakthrough Institute released a joint report proposing a post-partisan way forward on climate and energy policy that moves beyond the framework of cap and trade. The report, "Post-Partisan Power," ignited a firestorm of discussion.
To answer some of major questions about the report, E&E News OnPoint TV host Monica Trauzzi invited Breakthrough Institute Director of Climate and Energy Policy Jesse Jenkins and Brookings' Senior Fellow and Director of Policy for the Metropolitan Policy Program to join her show.
Throughout American history, federal investments in areas like science and technology have been a long-term driver of national prosperity under presidents both Democrat and Republican.
Throughout American history, strategic government investments in areas like education, technology, infrastructure, and energy catalyzed the entrepreneurship and innovation that has paved the way for so many of the great American technological and economic successes of the 20th century. In the words of conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks, the American story is one of "limited but energetic governments that used aggressive federal power to promote growth."
The new report calls for increasing federal innovation investment from roughly $4 today to $25 billion annually, and using military procurement, new, disciplined deployment incentives, and public-private hubs to achieve both incremental improvements and breakthroughs in clean energy technologies. The authors point to America's long-history of bi-partisan support for innovation.
Writes David Leonhardt in today's New York Times, "the death of cap and trade doesn't have to mean the death of climate policy. The alternative revolves around much more, and much better organized, financing for clean energy research. It's an idea with a growing list of supporters, a list that even includes conservatives -- most of whom opposed cap and trade."
Mark Muro of Brookings tells Politico the proposal's four parts "are broadly popular, provide a very broad and appealing American vision of economic transformation and are certainly far more doable than a global pricing system at this point." Added Steve Hayward of American Enterprise Institute, "The entire climate and energy agenda that we've been talking about for several years now has hit a dead end, so it's time to hit the reset button."
The Environmental Protection Agency 
The following was originally submitted to the National Journal discussion "
