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The Political Philosophy of James Hansen
By Breakthrough Senior Fellow Roger Pielke, jr., cross-posted from Prometheus

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James Hansen of NASA has written an op-ed for the Guardian that, more than any other piece of his that I've seen, expresses his political philosophy. In a phrase, that philosophy can be characterized as "scientific authoritarianism." Scientific authoritarianism, as I am using it here, holds that political decisions should be compelled by the political preferences of scientists. It is a very strong form of the "linear model" of science and decision making that I discuss in The Honest Broker.

Hansen believes that the advice of experts, and specifically his advice alone, should compel certain political outcomes. He opens his op-ed in the Guardian with this statement:

A year ago, I wrote to Gordon Brown asking him to place a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants in Britain. I have asked the same of Angela Merkel, Barack Obama, Kevin Rudd and other leaders.

Collectively, Brown, Merkel, Obama and Rudd lead about 500 million people. The idea that one person's policy views should carry so much weight in democratic societies is an indication that Hansen believes that expertise should carry decisive weight in decisions. Hansen is not even a citizen of Germany, Britain, or the United Kingdom, so the mere fact that he is asking the leaders of these countries to act based on his say-so is an expression of scientific authoritarianism. Rather than making the case for his preferred policy, Hansen's argument includes his complaint that policy makers have not followed his advice, which apparently, Hansen believes should take precedent over all other views.

Indeed, he dismisses the views of the public as being too poorly informed, too distracted or unsophisticated to contribute to decision making on the climate issue:

The public, buffeted by weather fluctuations and economic turmoil, has little time to analyse decadal changes. How can people be expected to evaluate and filter out advice emanating from those pushing special interests? How can people distinguish between top-notch science and pseudo-science?

By contrast, Hansen argues that policy makers cannot be excused for not understanding what the scientists demand:

Those who lead us have no excuse - they are elected to guide, to protect the public and its best interests. They have at their disposal the best scientific organisations in the world, such as the Royal Society and the US National Academy of Sciences. Only in the past few years did the science crystallise, revealing the urgency.
Hansen's scientific authoritarianism becomes largely incoherent when he accuses political leaders of "tricking" their citizens when they say that climate policies include plans for the future development and implementation of carbon capture and storage from coal plants:
The dirtiest trick that governments play on their citizens is the pretence that they are working on "clean coal" or that they will build power plants that are "capture-ready" in case technology is ever developed to capture all pollutants.

Where might governments have come up with the idea that carbon capture and storage from coal plants might be part of their climate policy portfolios?

Why from the very same experts that James Hansen says that policy makers have at their disposal. For example, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences recommended carbon capture and storage (CCS) as an important future technology in a glossy summary about what everyone should know about energy (here in PDF) and a 2003 workshop report on CCS (here in PDF) concluded:

One way to reduce atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide is through sequestration or the safe disposal of large quantities of carbon dioxide in locations where it will not reenter the atmosphere.

Similarly the UK Royal Society has endorsed CCS:

The Royal Society has called on the Government to ensure that any new coal-fired power plants built in the UK are capturing 90% of their carbon dioxide emissions by 2020
.

Similarly, the IPCC and IEA depend upon the future availability of CCS in all of their mitigation scenarios, and on this basis governments are investing resources in developing CCS technologies. It may not be enough of an investment or the governments may not be following the precise advice of their national societies, but those are not Hansen's arguments. His argument is that governments are tricking citizens. So if Hansen wants policy makers to listen to scientists, and scientists are calling for CCS research and deployment, and in fact assume such technologies in their mitigation scenarios, how can he fault policy makers for listening to exactly these recommendations?

Here Hansen swerves from scientific authoritarianism to megalomania:

The trains carrying coal to power plants are death trains. Coal-fired power plants are factories of death. . .

The German and Australian governments pretend to be green. When I show German officials the evidence that the coal source must be cut off, they say they will tighten the "carbon cap". But a cap only slows the use of a fuel - it does not leave it in the ground. When I point out that their new coal plants require that they convince Russia to leave its oil in the ground, they are silent. The Australian government was elected on a platform of solving the climate problem, but then, with the help of industry, it set emission targets so high as to guarantee untold disasters for the young, let alone the unborn. These governments are not green. They are black - coal black
.

The very notion that the German (or any) government has the obligation to answer to James Hansen is really odd, and one I don't think I've ever seen in any policy analysis on any subject: "When I show ... they say ... When I point out ... they are silent." It is a blatant appeal to authority to include the fact that one's views are not followed as part of the argument for why they should be followed. Hansen must have a pretty well-developed sense of worth to believe that his views should compel governments around the world to listen and follow.

On some important aspects of the climate policy issue I agree strongly with Hansen, for instance on the importance of air capture and the feebleness of current policy approaches. But with respect to his approach to climate politics, I could not be more in disagreement. [To head off straw man responses, because I disagree with his political philosophy does not mean that I disagree with any of his policy recommendations.] Climate policy successes will depend on successful processes of democratic governance necessarily involving public participation and support. Scientific authoritarianism, weak or strong, has no role in climate politics.

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TrackBacks (0) 3 COMMENTS:

Dr. Pielke,

In ordinary times, I would agree with your fundamental thesis that, "Climate policy successes will depend on successful processes of democratic governance necessarily involving public participation and support." And that, "Scientific authoritarianism, weak or strong, has no role in climate politics." As goes the tired but true cliche, however, these are not ordinary times. Democratic governance involving public participation and support takes time, and we just don't have enough. As Dr. Hanson says, our politicians "are elected to guide, to protect the public and its best interests." To do so in this case, at this time, requires that politicians put aside public participation and support and instead focus on the science, and the science tells us that we are headed down the wrong policy path. It is the responsibility of government, whether we as citizens are ready or not, to grab our arm and force us down the path that leads to stability, sustainability, and collective well-being.

Dr. Pielke,

In ordinary times, I would agree with your fundamental thesis that, "Climate policy successes will depend on successful processes of democratic governance necessarily involving public participation and support." And that, "Scientific authoritarianism, weak or strong, has no role in climate politics." As goes the tired but true cliche, however, these are not ordinary times. Democratic governance involving public participation and support takes time, and we just don't have enough. As Dr. Hanson says, our politicians "are elected to guide, to protect the public and its best interests." To do so in this case, at this time, requires that politicians put aside public participation and support and instead focus on the science, and the science tells us that we are headed down the wrong policy path. It is the responsibility of government, whether we as citizens are ready or not, to grab our arm and force us down the path that leads to stability, sustainability, and collective well-being.

A review of Melvin Rogers's The Undiscovered Dewey.

According to Leo Strauss, the proper approach to interpreting a philosophical text is one that “understands the thought of a philosopher exactly as he understood it himself” (What is Philosophy? Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, p. 66). Strauss’s insight should not be treated lightly. As a regulative ideal, appreciation of authorial intention ought to inform every scholar’s struggle to capture a text’s genuine meaning. Melvin Rogers’s new book on the religious and political ideas of John Dewey is also a struggle at scholarly exegesis, an ambitious attempt to reveal dimensions of the American Pragmatist’s philosophy that were, up until now, (as the title suggests) undiscovered. The book is organized into five chapters: (i) “a stylized intellectual history” (p. 15), (ii) an argument that Dewey’s theories of action and inquiry are modified extensions of Aristotelian categories, (iii) an interpretation of A Common Faith that closely allies Dewey and the American Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson, (iv) an account of Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation that makes it suitable for addressing more contemporary debates concerning pluralism and ethnic-religious conflict and (v) an exegesis of Dewey’s democratic vision as a method for managing power relations.

In the first chapter, Rogers relates three historical anecdotes from the nineteenth century: (i) Calvinist theologian Charles Hodge’s rejection of Darwinism, (ii) liberal Protestant attempts to reconcile faith and reason, and (iii) Max Weber’s pessimistic thesis that the rational march of modernity disenchants the self’s relation to the world. Dewey offers an alternative to all three accounts in his novel reading of Darwin: “Dewey’s point was that there is transactional relationship among self, other, and the world—resulting from the movement of an disruptions in life (what he called “problems”)—that generates and structures frameworks of meaning” (p. 48). So, life in a radically contingent Darwinian universe is not an occasion for disenchantment or a sick soul, but an opportunity to solve emergent problems and create new meanings.

In the second chapter, Rogers repeats his novel Aristotelian interpretation of Dewey’s theory of agency and inquiry (passim “Action and Inquiry in Dewey’s Philosophy,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, vol. 43, no. 1 (2007):90-115). Dewey identified Aristotle with that group of philosophers engaged in the “quest for certainty”: a systematic but failed attempt to theorize what we can know (epistemology), what exists (metaphysics), how we come to know (logic) and what we value (axiology) on apodictic foundations. Rogers contends that Dewey modified Aristotle’s epistemic categories (episteme, phronesis, and techne) in order to render a more dynamic theory of agency and inquiry. According to Aristotle, the intellectual virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom enables the moral agent to choose the middle way, the moral virtue (e.g. courage), between instances of excess (e.g., foolhardiness) and deficiency (e.g. cowardice). The same relation that manifests between phronesis and the moral virtues for Aristotle, Rogers argues, also holds for inquiry and human agency for Dewey (p. 90). Dewey’s method of inquiry or problem solving guides humans toward good judgment and virtuous conduct. Rogers writes: “If my reading [of Dewey’s theory of inquiry and agency as a modified version of Aristotle’s categories] is correct, it would show that for Dewey these independent dictates given the situation of concern are to be identified with inquiry—that is, practical wisdom and inquiry completely interpenetrate” (p. 95).

Chapter three weds Dewey’s meliorism (or faith in the capacity of ordinary persons to improve themselves) to his predecessor Ralph Waldo Emerson’s notion of self-reliance. In A Common Faith, Dewey identified the adjective ‘religious’ with a quality of experience, not a feature of organized religion or a property of institutions, and conceived faith as an imaginative projection of belief in still-to-be-realized potentialities, not just in the existence of divine objects or beings. Emersonian self-reliance combines “courage and dependence,” Rogers notes, “since the care of the self is dependent both prospectively and retrospectively on the seen and unseen of nature” (p. 125). Both Dewey’s idea of religious experience and Emerson’s notion of self-reliance return the objects of faith to the natural world and its inherent possibilities, rather than sequester those objects to some supersensible or supernatural realm (e.g. heaven or hell).

In chapter four, Rogers interprets Dewey’s model of moral deliberation as a method for addressing the modern fact of pluralism and ethnic-religious conflict in ways that resemble more recent normative theories (e.g., Sabina Lovibond’s ethical naturalism and Isaiah Berlin’s ontological pluralism). Rogers introduces the concept of “mutual responsiveness” to highlight how moral deliberation, following Dewey’s model, gives agents an outlet to sympathize with each other’s concerns (or imagine what it would be like to have each other’s attitudes in a process called “dramatic rehearsal”) and, thus, empowers them to offer reasons and judgments sensitive to those concerns (p. 170).

The final chapter examines Dewey’s debate with Walter Lippmann concerning the proper role of citizens within modern democratic states. What this portion of the book lacks is a good faith attempt, in Strauss’s words, to interpret “the thought of a philosopher exactly as he understood it himself.” Sometimes this requires going outside the text to the historical context—in this case, the Progressive-era politics of 1920s America, in which Lippmann, a disillusioned Progressive, sought to convert his fellow Progressives to his newfound elitist creed, and Dewey stepped in to mediate (see my “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter of Public Spirit: Reconstructing the Dewey-Lippmann Debate,” Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 25, vol. 3/4 (2005):17-25). Although Rogers claims to appreciate the sui generis quality of Dewey’s philosophy, he interprets Dewey’s ideas of freedom, democracy and “the public” through the filter of more recent theoretical frameworks, particularly, Phillip Pettit’s concept of freedom as nondomination, Sheldon Wolin’s notion of “the political,” and Jürgen Habermas's model of the public sphere, respectively. The result is undoubtedly the discovery of an undiscovered Dewey, but not the Dewey that orthodox Dewey scholars are familiar with—and not Dewey’s ideas as Dewey himself understood them.

All in all, Rogers’s The Undiscovered Dewey is a significant contribution to the growing literature on Dewey’s religious and political thought that is sure to provoke scholarly debate.

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